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"I don't believe there is any room in baseball for discrimination.
It's our true national pastime and a game for all."
Lou Gehrig, New York Yankees First Baseman 1923-39.1
ABSTRACT
This statistical study explores whether certain components of the
labor market in Major League Baseball foster racial discrimination in
setting player salaries. Based on the regression results in the study, the
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anecdotal evidence of racially insensitive remarks and discriminatory
practices, and the history of discrimination against minority players,
coaches, and executives, there is strong evidence that Major League
Baseball's reserve system, as a term and condition of employment, per-
petuates discrimination based on race in violation of Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act.
This study first considers all players on the Major League roster for
the years 1987-88. It then considers the performance statistics of these
players in 1987, national and local television revenues and appearances
in 1987, and the race of players as explanatory factors of players' 1988
salaries.
Departing from previous empirical studies on salary discrimination
in Major League Baseball, this study separates the labor market in Major
League Baseball into three submarkets to accurately reflect the relation-
ship of power between owners and players. In the first submarket,
known as the reserve market, owners unilaterally set the salary of play-
ers with zero to three years of Major League experience, so long as the
salary does not fall below the league minimum of $109,000. In the sec-
ond submarket, known as the arbitration market, owners and players
with three to six years of Major League experience submit proposed
salary offers to an arbitrator who chooses one of the proposals. In the
third submarket, known as the free agency market, owners bid competi-
tively for players with six years of Major League experience whose con-
tracts have ended.
The results from the regression model show that, among other
things, a minority pitcher with zero to three years of experience operat-
ing in the reserve market, where owners may unilaterally set salaries, is
paid $67,942.86 less than his white counterpart at a significance level of
0.01. However, there is no statistical evidence of discrimination against
minority pitchers operating in the free agency market where owners
must bid competitively to obtain the pitcher.
The results of the study strongly indicate a need for owners and
players, through the Major League Baseball Players Association ("Play-
ers Association"), to reevaluate the terms of the 1996 collective bargain-
ing agreement in light of the potential that certain terms in the agreement
may perpetuate racial discrimination in players' salaries. Major League
Baseball does not enter the discrimination debate with clean hands.
When Al Campanis, the former general manager of the Los Angeles
Dodgers, insisted that the lack of representatiaon by African-Americans
in the front offices of Major League Baseball teams was due to inferior
mental faculties, the nation expressed shock. Similarly, when the media
exposed the repeated use of racial and ethnic slurs by Cincinnati Reds
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owner Marge Schott, many shook their heads in disbelief. However,
people close to the inner circles of baseball were not surprised. After
all, professional baseball has historically and systematically discrimi-
nated against African-Americans for most of its existence. Although it
was believed that sordid past was relegated to the dark recesses of his-
tory, it still exists.
The 1994 baseball season presented an event unparalleled in its his-
tory as labor strife prematurely ended the season. With the end of the
season went the hearts of die-hard fans, who had "clung to that hope
which springs eternal in the human breast,"2 that the owners and the
players would settle their disagreements for the good of the game. It did
not happen, and as a result, August 12, 1994 is a date that will live in
infamy as long as baseball is played. That evening, fans at the Oakland
Coliseum witnessed the final pitch of the 1994 Major League Baseball
season, as the Athletics' pinch hitter, Ernie Young, whiffed on a fastball
from the Mariners' ace pitcher, Randy Johnson.3 As one sports journal-
ist explained:
With that final, futile swing, the national pastime went down for the
count as the more than 750 members of the Major League Players
Association began their long-dreaded strike, baseball's eighth work
stoppage since 1972. Never before have the games been halted this
late in the season. Never before have the October play-offs and the
World Series been in such dire jeopardy. Never before has the naked
power struggle between the players and owners seemed so heedless
and self-destructive.4
Both sides of the labor dispute immediately staked out their posi-
tions. Initially, it seemed that their proposals, comments, criticisms, and
counterproposals were aimed more at the fans than at each other, creat-
ing a nasty form of dysfunctional bargaining conducted through a will-
ing media. The owners, through their representative Richard Ravitch,
made several demands. They pushed for a salary cap to limit the
amounts teams may spend on free agents, for the elimination of salary
arbitration, for the retention of the $109,000 minimum salary for Major
League Baseball players, for fifty-fifty revenue sharing with the players,
and for revenue sharing among the clubs.5 The owners proposed reduc-
ing the free agency threshold from six to four years of service, while
retaining a right of first refusal to match any offer made to a player with
2. THE ANNOTATED CASEY AT THE BAT: A COLLECTION OF BALLADS ABOUT THE MIGHTY
CASEY 21 (University of Chicago Press, 2d ed. 1984).
3. See Walter Shapiro, Bummer of '94, TIME, Aug. 22, 1994, at 69.
4. Id.
5. See Baseball '94: The Shortest Season Q & A, ATLANTA CONST., Sept. 15, 1994, at D3.
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less than six years of service.6 When asked to share revenues with the
players, the owners proposed a guarantee totaling $1 billion to players
over seven years if revenues did not increase.7 Finally, after a four-year
phase-in period, club payrolls would have to fall between 84% and
110% of the Major League average. 8
The players, through their representative Donald Fehr, completely
rejected the owners' proposal. Fehr initially proposed to eliminate the
restriction on repeat free agency within a five-year span if a player's
club offers salary arbitration at the end of the contract.9 The players also
sought to reduce the threshold for salary arbitration to two years. 10
Finally, the players sought to increase the pensions for those players
playing before 1970 and to increase the minimum salary from $109,000
to between $175,000 and $200,000.11
After more posturing by both sides, the players announced their
second proposal-a tax of 1.5% of revenue on the sixteen teams gener-
ating the most revenue and the sixteen teams with the highest payrolls.1 2
The tax revenue would be distributed among the bottom twelve clubs in
revenue and in payroll. 13 Coupled with the proposed tax, the players
suggested that home teams share 25% of gate receipts with the visiting
team. "
Following the second proposal, weeks turned into months with no
end to the strike. Consequently, baseball began to suffer. The league
championships and the World Series were cancelled for the first time in
ninety years! 15 Moreover, during the winter, the players successfully
sued the owners for bad faith negotiations. 16 Barely into the 1995 spring
training season, the owners and players finally announced that they
would play the 1995 regular season without a new collective bargaining
6. See id.
7. See id.
8. See id.
9. See id.
10. See id. The two-year threshold to arbitration was the practice from 1974 through 1986.
Presently, salary arbitration is available to those players with three years of service and to the top
17% (measured in years, and fractions thereof, of Major League Baseball) of those with between
two and three years of service. See id.
11. See id.
12. See id.
13. See id.
14. See id. Currently, American League home teams share 20% and National League home
teams share about $0.43 per ticket over $1. See id.
15. It is estimated that the 232-day strike cost players $350 million in lost salaries and cost
owners $800 million in operating losses for the twenty-eight teams during a three-year period.
See Baseball Gets Peace Until 2000, FLA. TODAY, Dec. 6, 1996, at 01C.
16. See Silverman v. Major League Baseball Player Relations Comm., Inc., 880 F. Supp. 246
(S.D.N.Y. 1995).
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agreement. They agreed to operate under the terms of the previous,
expired collective bargaining agreement, and extended this agreement
for the 1996 season.
In August 1996, the owners and Players Association reconvened to
hammer out a new collective bargaining agreement. Although the par-
ties agreed on several key terms, significant issues remained
unresolved.17 The central feature of the proposal was a "luxury tax" that
would be imposed on clubs that exceeded certain payroll limits.18 For
example, clubs with payrolls exceeding $51 million in 1997, $55 million
in 1998, and $58 million in 1999, would have to pay a tax of approxi-
mately 35% of the excess; under the plan, there would be no tax in the
year 2000.19
Revenue-sharing appeared to be part of the proposal as well.
Although specific numbers were not publicized, the proposal requiring
high-revenue clubs to subsidize low-revenue clubs had been labeled
"modest."2 Additionally, the new proposal retained salary arbitration.
The new format, however, required a three person panel;21 presently,
only a single arbitrator decides salary disputes.
As of October 1996, several points of contention remained. First,
the Players Association insisted that players receive credit for the sev-
enty-five lost days of service time.22 Several owners strongly opposed
this measure.23 Second, the Players Association balked on releasing the
owners from damages resulting from the 1994-95 strike, at least until the
owners relent on the issue of lost service time credit.24 Finally, the Play-
ers Association sought to extend the agreement through the year 2001,
with no payroll tax in the final year.25
After initially rejecting the tentative agreement hammered out by
Randy Levine, the owners' negotiator, and Donald Fehr, executive
director of the Players Association, the owners approved the new propo-
sal on November 26, 1996.26 Many observers found the event that led to
the owners abrupt about-face was the enlistment by Chicago White Sox
owner Jerry Reinsdorf of Albert Belle to a five-year, $55 million con-
17. See Next Move Uncertain as Talks Stall, ATLANTA CONST., Aug. 14, 1996, at C3.
18. See id.
19. See id.
20. See id.
21. See id.
22. See id. Service time dictates when a player becomes eligible for arbitration and free
agency.
23. Because of pre-strike changes in league governance, twenty-one of twenty-eight clubs
must approve an agreement. See id.
24. See id.
25. See id.
26. See Baseball Gets Peace Until 2000, supra note 15, at 01C.
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tract.27 A commentator opined:
What makes the act [Belle's contract] so hypocritical is that
Reinsdorf was the ringleader of the opposition to a labor agreement
which, among other things, mandates that lucrative clubs pay a lux-
ury tax to help support smaller franchises. The agreement was ham-
mered out by owners' own committee.
As for his own opposition, Reinsdorf charged that the new
agreement didn't do enough to curtail players' salaries.
The signing of Belle, for more money than the slugger was pub-
licly seeking, forced other owners to recognize that the enemy was
one of them, not necessarily the Player's Association.28
On December 5, 1996, the players unanimously approved the labor
agreement.29 Pursuant to the agreement, fourteen players, including
Alex Fernandez, Moises Alou, and Jimmy Key became free agents as of
December 7, 1996.30 Additionally, the collective bargaining agreement
imposed a 35% luxury tax on portions of payrolls above $51 million for
the 1997 season for the five highest team payrolls. 31 The tax will remain
in effect for the 1997-99 seasons, but not for the 2000 season or the 2001
option year.3 2 The tax was designed to curb increases in team pay-
rolls;33 however, the tax must be put in perspective. The average salary
in the Major League for 1996 was $1,119,981, 31 an increase of only
0.8% and 4.1% below the level of salaries before the 1994-95 strike,35
while team salaries totaled $929.6 million. 36 The New York Yankees,
the 1996 World Champions, had the highest average salary at
$1,882,417, and the top payroll at $64 million.37 Milwaukee owned the
lowest payroll average at $420,320,38 and Montreal had the lowest total
payroll at $15.4 million. 39 The eight 1996 post-season teams all had
average payrolls among the top eleven teams.'
27. See Editorial, In Our View, INTELLIGENCE J., Dec. 3, 1996, at A10.
28. Id.
29. See Baseball Gets Peace Until 2000, supra note 15, at 01C.
30. See id. As part of the agreement, players receive credit for service time during the
seventy-five regular season days wiped out by the strike.
31. See Baseball Players Vote for the Labor Agreement, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Dec. 6, 1996,
available in 1996 WL 12431209.
32. See id.
33. See id.
34. See Salaries in Baseball Average $1,119,981, FORT WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM, Dec. 4,
1996, at 1, available in 1996 WL 11355600.
35. See id. The average salary in 1994 was a record $1,168,263, and the salary in 1995 was
the first substantial decline in thirty years.
36. See id.
37. See id.
38. See id.
39. See Stephen Baker, Baseball's Losers Still Lose, Bus. WK., Dec. 16, 1996, at 42.
40. See id.
[Vol. 52:461
TITLE VII AND THE RESERVE CLAUSE
Along with the luxury tax, the new agreement provides for a lim-
ited form of revenue sharing. High-revenue teams are forced to give up
a higher percentage of their locally-generated broadcast and ticket
money.4 ' One account states that the thirteen richest clubs will transfer
some $70 million in 1997 to the thirteen poorest clubs.42 Players will
also transfer 2.5% of their own salaries for revenue sharing.43
While the clubs and the players alternately engaged in posturing
and serious frank discussions about the future of the labor market in
baseball, this Article argues that the parties should have considered the
effect on minorities of traditional components of the historic labor mar-
ket in baseball. Traditionally, baseball is perceived as a meritocracy.
Conventional wisdom suggests that discrimination, so much a part of
this country's labor market, does not infect modern Major League Base-
ball. Our statistical study suggests that it may, or that at least there may
be evidence of discrimination which should be directly confronted. This
Article constructs a statistical model based on several assumptions dis-
closed below. 4
The regression model suggests that the differences in salary
between minority and white Major League Baseball players may be
driven by, among other things, the race of the player. It does not neces-
sarily follow from the results of the regression model, however, that
invidious discrimination in fact exists in baseball.45 It is not this Arti-
cle's primary purpose to establish a prima facie case of employment
discrimination against the owners. Rather, it seeks to expose certain
components of the present labor market and conditions of employment
that may harbor or mask discrimination against minority baseball
players.
This Article will also explore the present labor market in Major
League Baseball as framed by the present collective bargaining agree-
ment under the lens of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.46 We analyze
evidence, both anecdotal and statistical, suggesting the existence of sal-
ary discrimination, using a legal theory known as systemic disparate
treatment. After carefully explaining the statistical model and the results
and inferences therefrom, it suggests a fresh look at certain components
of the Major League Baseball labor market.
41. See Baseball Gets Peace Until 2000, supra note 15, at 01C.
42. See Baker, supra note 39, at 42.
43. See id.
44. See infra text accompanying notes 238-44.
45. Statistical and legal significance are two different concepts. The results of a model may
be statistically significant but lacking in legal significance. See Daniel L. Rubinfield, Reference
Guide on Multiple Regression, in REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCL METHODS 429 (1994).
46. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-e4 (1994).
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Part I of this Article describes the trichotomized labor market in
Major League Baseball. Although a number of studies have considered
the labor market in Major League Baseball as one market, it is mislead-
ing to view the baseball labor market in that manner-Major League
Baseball is actually composed of three submarkets. Players with up to
three years of Major League experience comprise the first submarket.
These players remain governed by the reserve clause.47 This labor sub-
market is the least competitive. Aside from the minimum salary set in
the collective bargaining agreement between the owners and the play-
ers,48 players laboring under the reserve clause have no negotiating
power with regard to their salaries. Owners have the power unilaterally
to establish player salaries. Thus, first submarket players must either
take it or leave it. The second submarket consists of players with three
to six years of experience. These players operate under the reserve
clause, but may seek salary arbitration if there is no agreement on salary.
Although far from a competitive market, the second submarket's anti-
competitive effect on salary are tempered by the driving forces of a third
submarket-the free agency submarket. Players with over six years of
Major League experience are free from the reserve clause and may file
for free agency upon the completion of their contract. This third sub-
market closely reflects a free, competitive market economy, in which
owners bid on a player's services, with the player usually accepting the
highest offer.49
Part II investigates the question of whether salary discrimination
exists in Major League Baseball. The section begins by providing a
concise review of the statutory framework applicable to discrimination
in employment, focusing on salary discrimination and the use of statisti-
cal models to infer discrimination and intent. Although Major League
Baseball is exempt from the application of antitrust laws,5" it is not
exempt from the application of anti-discrimination laws, such as those
47. The reserve clause is a provision in the Uniform Player's Contract that forbids a player
under contract from playing baseball for any other professional baseball club. See Basic
Agreement, Schedule A, at 86 (on file with the authors); see also MARTIN J. GREENBERG, 1
SPORTS LAW PRACTICE § 5.08(1), at 405 (1993); GERALD W. SCULLY, THE BUSINESS OF MAJOR
LEAGUE BASEBALL 23-24 (1989). Member clubs agreed not to contract, negotiate, or sign players
reserved to another club without club permission.
48. In 1996, the minimum salary was $109,000. See Baseball '94: The Shortest Season Q &
A, supra note 5, at D3.
49. This is not always the case. Both Greg Maddux of the Atlanta Braves and Kirby Puckett
of the Minnesota Twins (who recently retired) accepted offers less than the highest offer made to
them for other reasons. See JOHN HELYAR, LORDS OF THE REALM: THE REAL HISTORY OF
BASEBALL 460 (1994); Ross Newhan, Baseball Winter Meetings: Crisis? What Crisis?, L.A.
TIMs, Dec. 10, 1992, at Cl.
50. See Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1994); see also Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S.
258 (1972) (holding Major League Baseball as judicially exempt from Sherman Antitrust Act).
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found in Title VII.51
Part II also announces the results of our statistical study of salary
discrimination. This Article is the first to consider the salaries of all
Major League Baseball players and to control for revenues generated by
and exposure on national and local television. The study shows that
there is statistically significant evidence of salary discrimination against
pitchers based on race and ethnicity in the reserve clause and arbitration
submarkets. This occurs when owners unilaterally set players' salaries
in the case of the reserve system or where, in the case of arbitration, a
neutral third-party determines a salary based on numbers submitted by
the player and the owner. In short, in reserve clause and arbitration sub-
markets, white pitchers earn $67,942.86 more than minority pitchers at a
0.01 level of significance-a very significant result. Our study, how-
ever, shows no statistically significant evidence of discrimination
against minority pitchers in the free agency submarket.
The study also shows a correlation between race and salary for hit-
ters in the combined arbitration and free agency submarkets, with white
hitters earning $26,781.56 more than minority hitters at a 0.18 level of
significance. It does not show statistically significant evidence of dis-
crimination, however, in the reserve system submarkets.
Permeating the analysis is the question of whether a free market
stops discrimination. Because of the strong evidence of salary discrimi-
nation against hitters in the combined arbitration/free agency submarket,
the study suggests that a free market may not end discrimination, partic-
ularly when the owners of competing teams are not attempting to maxi-
mize profits, or when a positive profit stream short of maximization is
acceptable.
Part III of this Article sets out a proposal to substantially modify
the labor market in Major League Baseball. In particular, it provides a
comprehensive market plan accommodating both the interests of the
players and the owners, and ameliorating what appears to be systematic
discrimination against minority pitchers in the reserve system sub-
market. This plan rejects the paradigmatic labor market model for mod-
em Major League Baseball as potentially discriminatory, anti-
competitive, incoherent, and unjustifiable, and proposes instead a global
model for the labor market that abolishes the amateur draft, modifies the
present reserve system, eliminates salary arbitration and salary cap pro-
posals, and rejects revenue sharing among clubs.
51. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-e4 (1994).
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I. THE TRICHOTOMIZED MARKET IN MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL
To begin the analysis, it is beneficial to construct the contours of
the present labor market in Major League Baseball with an eye toward
mapping the shifts in power from the owners to the players. Thus, the
following discussion about the trichotomized market in Major League
Baseball is more than an historical overview; it is designated to provide
context to what the negotiations between owners and players in Major
League Baseball are all about: power!
A. The Draft
Every June, Major League Baseball teams select high school and
college players as part of the amateur draft. The draft continues until
either the clubs run out of players they wish to select, or the 'reach fifty
rounds. 2 Teams select players in inverse order of standings and alter-
nate between leagues. 3 Players do not have the option to declare them-
selves eligible for the draft; the clubs do that for them. Of course, a
player may refuse to sign with a club and re-enter the draft the following
year;54 however, he may not play Major League Baseball in the interim.
If a player signs with a club, he typically executes a Uniform Minor
League contract and receives about $700 a month to play minor league
baseball.5 Typically, the player may also receive a signing bonus from
over $2 million for a first-round choice to $12,000 for a twenty-second-
round choice. 6 The minor league contract is renewable solely by the
drafting team for six consecutive years after the first year of play.57
Additionally, each year during late October, the clubs, in reverse
order of standing, may select minor league players for major league sta-
tus. 8 "All players on the reserve lists of National Association clubs are
eligible for the draft. Clubs may continue to select players until their
player limit is reached. '59 A selecting club is required to compensate a
selected player's former club with the compensation amounts tied to the
52. See GREENBERG, supra note 47, § 5.24, at 440. Before 1992, the draft had no cap on its
rounds. By comparison, basketball has two rounds and football has seven. See id. See also
Thomas George, Pro Football: Free Agency Put Aside, It's Draft Day, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 25, 1993,
§ 8, at 1.
53. See GREENBERG, supra note 47, § 5.24, at 440. In even years, the National League has
first pick, and in odd years, the American League has first pick.
54. See id. at 441.
55. See id. at 436.
56. Major League Baseball has been criticized for hiot immediately releasing the names of
those drafted and their place in the draft, presumably to keep agents from identifying potential
clients and using the list as a tool in negotiation. See id. at 442.
57. See id. at 436.
58. See SCULLY, supra note 47, at 25.
59. Id.
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competition level of the club. For instance, a Major League team pays
more than an AAA team.60 Professor Gerald Scully continues:
Once the player has been upgraded to major league status he may not
be freely returned to the minors. No assignment of a player contract
to a National Association club may occur without the granting of
waivers by other major league clubs. If all of the major league clubs
waive claims on the player contract, he may be assigned, and the
assigned club pays 50% of the original price paid for the selection.
The major league club is responsible for any difference between the
player's contracted major league salary and the monthly salary rate in
the player's National Association Uniform Player Contract. 6'
The Major League Baseball draft operates as a group boycott.
Through various agreements, the clubs have agreed that any club that
selects the rights to a player through the draft has the exclusive rights to
that player's services. All other teams agree not to contact, negotiate, or
contract with that player.
Recently, Major League Baseball witnessed life, albeit with just
one player, without the downward pressure on salaries caused by the
draft. In October 1996, the expansion team Arizona Diamondbacks
signed free-agent first baseman Travis Lee to a four-year, $10 million
contract.62 Included in the package was a $5 million signing bonus. Lee
was originally drafted by the Minnesota Twins in the June 1996 draft as
the team's second pick. The Twins failed to tender a formally executed
contract within fifteen days of the draft in accordance with Major
League Rule Number 4(e).6 3 The Twins' failure to comply with Rule
Number 4(e) forced the Commissioner's Office to declare Lee a free
agent. 64
Lee's agent/attorney, Jeff Moorad, stated the exceptional salary is
"indicative of what teams are willing to pay if forced to compete for top
amateur talent. '65 To put the Lee signing in perspective, the number one
pick in the June 1996 draft, Kris Benson, signed for $2 million with the
Pittsburgh Pirates.6 6 These circumstances provide strong proof of the
downward pressure on salaries exerted by the draft in Major League
Baseball.
60. See id.
61. Id.
62. See Scorecard: A Bomb Drops on Baseball, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Oct. 21, 1996, at 19-
20.
63. See PROFESSIONAL BASEBALL RULES BOOK, Major League Rule Number 4(e). The rule
was passed by the Player Relations Committee after the 1990 season. See Scorecard: A Bomb
Drops on Baseball, supra note 62, at 20.
64. See Scorecard: A Bomb Drops on Baseball, supra note 62, at 20.
65. Id.
66. See id. at 22.
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B. The Reserve System
In 1876, a group of baseball clubs seeking greater financial stability
formed the National League. Among a number of pressing financial
concerns was the owners' belief that unrestrained competition for play-
ers among the clubs would bode serious financial consequences.67 In
1879, Jim O'Rourke became upset when his team, the Boston
Beaneaters, would not buy him a uniform.68 He quit the team and
signed on with another professional baseball team. The teams owners,
distressed by this turn of events, agreed to exchange lists of players from
each team who would be "off-limits" to the rest of the league. These
players were deemed "reserved" to one team only.
Furthermore, in response to the belief that free agency could ruin
baseball, the National League owners secretly agreed to introduce a
player reservation rule. Under the secret rule, a club possessed exclu-
sive property rights to five players.69 Other clubs were forbidden to
compete for the contracts of the five reserve players. Any reserve player
who jumped to another club would be blacklisted, and clubs that
employed such players would be boycotted. Thus, reserve players had
the severely limited choices of either playing baseball with the club that
held their reservation rights, or not playing professional baseball at all.
The reserve system became an effective mechanism in reducing club
roster costs and increasing the fiscal stability of the National League.
By the 1883 season, a National League club could protect its entire
player roster through the use of the reserve rule. 70 Eventually, the own-
ers incorporated this agreement into all major and minor league baseball
contracts as the "reserve clause."7 By 1903, when the National League
and American League formed Major League Baseball, the reserve sys-
tem had become an integral part of the warp and woof of the baseball
players' market.
During the first one hundred years of Major League Baseball, the
owners exerted almost complete control over the players and the game,
especially regarding players' salaries. For example, Ralph Kiner, now a
member of baseball's Hall of Fame, hit thirty-seven home runs for the
last place Pirates in 1952. This was the seventh consecutive year Kiner
led the league in home runs. Branch Rickey, then owner of the Pirates,
announced he was cutting Kiner's salary by 25%, reasoning that the
67. See ScuLLY, supra note 47, at 2.
68. O'Rourke is now a member of the Hall of Fame. See Thomas J. Hopkins, Arbitration: A
Major League Effect on Players' Salaries, 2 SETON HALL J. SPORTS L. 301, 303 (1992).
69. See ScuLLY, supra note 47, at 2.
70. See id. at 3.
71. See id. at 3-4.
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Pirates would have finished last with or without Kiner.72 Likewise,
Mickey Mantle won the Most Valuable Player Award in 1956 and 1957.
Yet, when Mantle signed his new contract, the Yankees offered a
$10,000 pay cut. This heavy-handed treatment was not unusual.
The reserve system gave a team the exclusive rights to a player
while he was under contract with the team and for the next contract year,
effectively binding the player to a team for life.73 From the owners'
perspective, this protected the team from interference by richer teams
and enabled the team to recoup its investment in the player.74 The
reserve system enabled teams to artificially limit players' salaries by
assigning each player a contract, essentially making players indentured
servants,75 and in turn, providing more money to baseball owners.
Therefore, the player had two options: (1) he could accept the team's
contract offer, or (2) he could retire from professional baseball.
Moreover, if a player sat out a year, he would lose a year's salary
and the league's other teams would blacklist him.76 Alternatively, a
team could release a player at any time with only ten days' notice. 77
These circumstances led to the players' unequal bargaining position in
the early years of Major League Baseball.
Every professional baseball player must sign a Uniform Players'
Contract. The contract may not contain a bonus clause for playing,
pitching, or batting skills, or contain a bonus contingent upon club
standing. The use of the Uniform Players' Contract is intended to "pre-
serve morale and to produce the similarity of conditions necessary to
keen competition, the contracts between all clubs and their players in the
Major Leagues shall be in a single form. No club should make a con-
tract different from the uniform contract or a contract containing a non-
reserve clause ... "78 Pursuant to the contract, a player "agrees to
render skilled services as a baseball player during the year ... including
the clubs' training season, the clubs' exhibition games, the clubs' play-
ing season, and the World Series ... or any other official series in which
the club may participate."79 Additionally, the player is free to terminate
his contract with the club and seek a contract with another club only if
"the Club shall default in the payments to the Player" or "fail to perform
72. See HELYAR, supra note 49, at 10.
73. See Hopkins, supra note 68, at 304.
74. See Robert A. McCormick, Labor Relations in Professional Sports: Lessons in Collective
Bargaining, 14 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 501, 502 (1989).
75. See ScuLL, supra note 47, at 29.
76. See Kevin A. Rings, Baseball, Free Agency and Salary Arbitration, 3 OHIO ST. J. ON
Disp. RESOL. 243, 245 (1987).
77. See id. at 245 n.19; see also Philadelphia Ball Club v. Lajoie, 51 A. 973 (Pa. 1902).
78. ScuLLY, supra note 47, at 23.
79. Id.
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... [its] ... other obligation[s] ... and if the club shall fail to remedy
such . . . within ten (10) days after the receipt by the Club of written
notice of such default."8 The club may terminate the contract if the
player fails to demonstrate good citizenship and sportsmanship, fails to
keep himself in peak physical condition, fails to obey the clubs' training
rules, fails to exhibit sufficient skill, or fails to render other services
stipulated in the contract.
The reserve clause was a matter of bitter dispute between manage-
ment and the players in the 1975 labor negotiations. Prior to 1976, play-
ers were bound indefinitely to their clubs. As a result of the now famous
Messersmith arbitration decision, players were declared eligible for free
agency after playing one year without a contract.8" The Basic Agree-
ment between the owners and players stipulates conditions and proce-
dures for free agency, binding salary arbitration, and player trading.
There have been numerous legal challenges to Major League Base-
ball's reserve clause. In theory, the reserve clause appears to violate
section one of the Sherman Antitrust Act.8" The effect of the reserve
clause is to prevent a player's ability to sell his services to the highest
bidder. The clause operates in a manner similar to a group boycott;
teams that do not own the rights to a player cannot and will not contact,
negotiate, or contract with a player without the consent of the club that
has such rights.
In Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore v. National League of Pro-
fessional Baseball Clubs,83 the Supreme Court strengthened owners'
control over players. In that case, the Federal League, a rival profes-
sional baseball league, attempted to lure away star players of the
National League, but were frustrated by the reserve clause.84 The Fed-
eral League claimed the defendants destroyed their league by buying
several of the Federal League teams, and by blacklisting the Federal
League players.8 5 The Federal League asserted that the reserve system
violated federal antitrust laws, but the Supreme Court disagreed. Justice
Holmes ruled that Major League Baseball was a business "giving exhibi-
tions of baseball, which are purely state affairs. 86 Moreover, although
the league "must induce free persons to cross state lines," this transpor-
80. Uniform Player's Contract 7(a), in LIONEL S. SOBEL, PROFESSIONAL SPORTS & THE LAW
669-70 (1977).
81. See JAMES B. DWORKIN, OWNERS VERSUS PLAYERS: BASEBALL AND COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING 78 (1981).
82. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1994).
83. 259 U.S. 200 (1922).
84. See id. at 206.
85. See H. Ward Classen, Three Strikes and You're Out: An Investigation of Professional
Baseball's Antitrust Exemption, 21 AKRON L. REv. 369, 377 (1988).
86. Federal Baseball, 259 U.S. at 208.
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tation was incidental and not essential to the game.87 Accordingly, Jus-
tice Holmes concluded that baseball was not a business engaged in
interstate commerce, and thus, was not subject to antitrust laws.88
Affording Major League Baseball this court-crafted antitrust exemption
enables it to govern itself without any real threat of government
intervention.
Many criticize the Federal Baseball case as an anomaly, which is
illogical and unfair to the players, noting that other sports are not exempt
from the ambit of antitrust laws.89 Nevertheless, Federal Baseball has
continued to serve as precedent for further challenges to the business of
professional baseball on antitrust grounds.90
In 1953, the Supreme Court reaffirmed its holding in Federal Base-
ball in Toolson v. New York Yankees, Inc.91 In that case, Toolson, a
pitcher for the New York Yankees, refused to report to the team's farm
club. In response, the team blacklisted him and prevented him from
playing for any other team. Toolson argued that Major League Base-
ball's monopoly deprived him of his livelihood.92 The Court relied on
the fact that baseball "has... been left for thirty years to develop, on the
understanding that it was not subject to existing antitrust legislation. 93
The Court refused to address the merits of the case and held that "if
there are evils in this field which now warrant application to it of the
antitrust laws it should be by legislation." '94 Thus, the Supreme Court
announced that "any change in the nonapplicability of the antitrust laws
to baseball would henceforth have to be made by Congress and not the
judiciary." 95
Despite indications that the Court was willing to remove baseball's
antitrust exemption, in 1972 the Supreme Court, citing the doctrine of
stare decisis, again upheld the reserve clause's validity in Flood v.
Kuhn.96 In that case, pursuant to the reserve system, the St. Louis
Cardinals traded Curt Flood to another team without consultation. Flood
87. Id. at 209.
88. See id.
89. See, e.g., Radovich v. National Football League, 352 U.S. 445 (1957) (holding that
professional football is not exempt from antitrust laws); United States v. International Boxing
Club, Inc., 348 U.S. 236 (1955) (finding that not all professional sports were outside the scope of
the antitrust laws, including the International Boxing Club); see also Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258,
282-83 (1972) (noting that "other professional sports operating interstate-football, boxing,
basketball, and, presumably, hockey and golf-are not so exempt").
90. But see Piazza v. Major League Baseball, 831 F. Supp. 420 (E.D. Penn. 1993).
91. 346 U.S. 356 (1953).
92. See id. at 366.
93. Id. at 357.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. 407 U.S. 258 (1972).
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claimed this trade violated antitrust laws.97 The Court admitted baseball
was a business engaged in interstate commerce, 98 and that Federal Base-
ball's reasoning was no longer sound, yet decided to uphold the cases
stemming from it. The Court explained that the antitrust exemption set
forth in Federal Baseball and reaffirmed in Toolson is an "aberration
confined to baseball."99 The Court reasoned that this aberration
reflected Major League Baseball's special relationship with the United
States and constituted a "recognition and an acceptance of baseball's
unique characteristics and needs." 1" The Court concluded by stating,
"[i]f there is any inconsistency or illogic in all of this, it is an inconsis-
tency and illogic long standing that is to be remedied by the Congress
and not by this Court." 10 1 No congressional remedy ever came. There-
fore, the players needed to seek some other avenue of relief from the
oppressiveness of the owners and the reserve system. This relief came
in the form of arbitration and the collective bargaining process.
Under the Basic Agreement between management and the players,
the effect of the reserve system has been tempered. Both final-offer sal-
ary arbitration and free agency ameliorate the harsh anti-competitive
effect of the reserve clause on player salaries. Nevertheless, the reserve
system remains a significant component of the players' labor market for
those players with less than three years experience in the major leagues.
At this point, it is beneficial to review the impact the amateur draft
and the reserve system have on the labor market. Up until the advent of
salary arbitration in the 1970's, all the power in contract negotiations
rested with the owners, who consistently abused it for their own benefit.
Though the power of the draft and the reserve system permitted the own-
ers to set artificially low salaries, allowing the owners to exploit their
players, a player's only power was to leave the game of baseball. He
could forego baseball and enter another profession. Nevertheless, as
long as the owners set salaries equal to or above salaries in competing
97. Flood complained to Commissioner Kuhn that he was not a "piece of property to be
bought and sold irrespective of [his] wishes." Id. at 288-89.
98. See id. at 282.
99. Id.
100. Id. The Court justified treating baseball differently than football, boxing, hockey, and
non-sports entertainment based on Major League Baseball's uniqueness, in that it developed
around the antitrust exemption. See also Stephen F. Ross, AN ANTITRUST ANALYSIS OF SPORTS
LEAGUE CONTRACTS WITH CABLE NETWORKS, 39 EMORY L.J. 463, 474 (1990).
101. Flood, 407 U.S. at 284. The Court elaborated:
We continue to be loath, 50 years after Federal Baseball and almost two decades
after Toolson, to overturn those cases judicially when Congress, by its positive
inaction, has allowed those decisions to stand for so long and, far beyond mere
inference and implication, has clearly evinced a desire not to disprove them
legislatively.
Id. at 283-84.
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markets, usually markets for unskilled labor, the owners had little worry
of a talent drain.
With the introduction of arbitration and free agency, however, the
owners' tendency to exploit their players was severely blunted. For the
first time in over one hundred years, players could look to systems of
compensation that more closely approximated a free market. With this
increased power, players uncovered what they suspected all along: own-
ers were paying all players salaries well below their market values.
What this study shows, however, is that owners may be paying their
minority players less than white players, in part, on the basis of race.
C. Arbitration
As an industry, Major League Baseball has seen many changes.
The most dramatic structural changes have come in the players' market
in the form of arbitration and free agency. Since 1974, baseball has had
binding final-offer salary arbitration,10 2 and since 1976, free agency for
eligible veteran players.10 3
Contrary to popular opinion, owners, and not players, first proposed
salary arbitration. After the Supreme Court decided Flood v. Kuhn, the
owners concluded that the players should have an opportunity to have
salary grievances heard by a neutral party, largely as a mechanism to
stave off any player attempts to impose free agency.
Arbitration is the "submission of a dispute to an impartial person or
persons on the basis of evidence and arguments presented by the par-
ties.""' Arbitration in the United States became popular during World
War II as a means to expeditiously resolve labor disputes and prevent
work stoppages that would cripple the war effort.10 5 Today, almost all
collective bargaining agreements contain provisions for settling disputes
through arbitration.'0 6 In the 1970 collective bargaining agreement, the
players and owners agreed to employ the arbitration system to settle
internal disputes.'0 7 After the Flood case, Marvin Miller, the Executive
Director of the Players Association, realized that the courts would be of
no use to players. Miller also knew that the players would not gain
meaningful concessions from owners through the collective bargaining
102. For an excellent discussion of baseball arbitration, see GREENBERG, supra note 47, § 5.17,
at 423-29.
103. For an excellent discussion of free agency in baseball, see id. § 5.18, at 429-32.
104. Marvin F. Hill & Anthony V. Sinicropi, Improving the Arbitration Process: A Primer for
Advocates, 27 WaLLAME-rE L. Rnv. 463, 468 (1991).
105. See id. at 466.
106. See id.
107. See MARviN MILER, A WHOLE DIFFERENr BALLGAME: THE SPORT AND BusINEss OF
BASEBALL 214 (1991).
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process, 1° 8 recognizing that players had no effective leverage in negotia-
tions. Arbitration was the last avenue of relief, and it ultimately pro-
vided players with the bargaining power to end the owners' complete
and total control over the labor market.
In 1975, two players, Andy Messersmith and Dave McNally,
refused to sign contracts to play for their teams that season. Both play-
ers rejected the efficacy of the reserve clause and claimed the freedom to
sign with any team. °9 The Los Angeles Dodgers, Messersmith's team,
invoked the reserve clause to force him to play the 1975 season, and
assigned Messersmith a new contract. This new contract also contained
a new reserve clause.11° Though he played that season with the Dodg-
ers, Messersmith never signed the new contract. Messersmith claimed
the Dodgers no longer had contractual control over him. 11 The owners
claimed that the reserve clause continued to bind players, like Messser-
smith, to their respective teams forever, even if they did not sign the new
contracts. Under this argument, if the owners prevailed, the players
would be bound to a team for as long as the team desired.
Pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement, the case came
before a panel of arbitrators headed by Peter Seitz. The panel ruled in
favor of the players and declared the players "free agents."' " 2 The own-
ers challenged the panel's decision, but the reviewing court rejected the
owners' argument. 13 This decision enabled the players to establish
their value on the open market for the first time as free agents, and
ended total owner control over players' salaries.
While Major League Baseball is currently exempt from federal
antitrust laws, owners and players are obligated to negotiate under the
National Labor Relations Act.114 Since the reserve system could no
longer be used to settle salary disputes in a number of situations, the
owners and players adopted binding "final offer" arbitration." 5
108. See Michael J. Cozziilio, From the Land of Bondage: The Greening of Major League
Baseball Players and the Major League Baseball Players Association, 41 CATH. U. L. REv. 117,
131-32 (1991) (reviewing MARVIN MILLER, A WHOLE DiFFrErr BALLOAME: THE SPORT AND
BuslN'ss OF BASEBALL (1991)).
109. See Rings, supra note 76, at 250.
110. See id.
S11. See id. McNally essentially took the same actions with his team.
112. See id. Major League Baseball Commissioner, Bowie Kuhn, fired Seitz immediately after
the ruling.
113. See Kansas City Royals Baseball Corp. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n, 409 F.
Supp. 233, 250 (W.D. Mo. 1976), affd, 532 F.2d 615 (8th Cir. 1976).
114. See American League of Prof'l Baseball Clubs, 180 N.L.R.B. 190 (1969); see also
DWORKIN, supra note 81, at 38.
115. See Paul Gordon, Submitting "Fair Value" to Final Offer Arbitration, 63 U. COLO. L.
REV. 751, 756-57 (1992). Final Offer Arbitration was devised by economist Carl Stevens. See
also James Warren, College Prof Spawns Baseball Arbitration, Author Proud of Intellectual
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To a certain extent, salary arbitration in baseball was never
intended to be used. The structure of Final Offer Arbitration promotes
settlement by encouraging both sides to submit reasonable offers.' 16 If
an arbitrator deems a party's offer unreasonable, the arbitrator chooses
the other offer by default. "The intended effect is that, in the process of
making compromises to enhance the attractiveness of their final offers to
the arbitrator, the parties will reach common ground and come so close
to a settlement that they will resolve their differences voluntarily."
' 1 7
More than 90% of players eligible for salary arbitration reach a settle-
ment before the hearing occurs, which shows that pressures to force
agreement are working.' 1 8
In Major League Baseball, salary arbitration goes into effect when
the parties reach an impasse in negotiating an eligible player's salary.
1 9
Currently, all players in Major League Baseball with three to six years
of service, as well as 17% of the second year players (also known as
"senior two's"), are eligible for salary arbitration.1 20 Once the negotia-
tion reaches an impasse, the team and the player each submit a one year
salary figure to the arbitrator. Next, the arbitrator (recently changed into
a three-member panel) conducts a hearing where each side presents evi-
dence to support why its proposed salary figure best reflects the player's
worth. The arbitrator must choose one of the figures presented by the
parties,1 21 then must issue a decision within one day. While the decision
is binding, the arbitrator is not required to render a written opinion.
Moreover, arbitrators must limit their decision to criteria agreed upon in
the current collective bargaining agreement. Presently, arbitrators con-
sider the following:
(1) the quality of the player's contribution to the team during the
"Baby," CHt. TRIB., Mar. 4, 1990, at 9C. Stevens was concerned that parties involved in
conventional arbitration might take extreme positions, believing the arbitrator would split the
difference. Stevens sought a system that encouraged both sides to put their best offer on the table
and truly bargain. Stevens explained, "[m]y hypothesis was that this would encourage parties to
bargain. One side would offer what it felt an arbitrator would see as more reasonable, thus
providing a moderate influence." Id.
116. See Roger I. Abrams, Sports Labor Relations: The Arbitrator's Turn at Bat, 5 ENT. &
SPORTS L.J. 1, 7 (1988).
117. Gordon, supra note 115, at 757 (quoting 1 LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT ARBrTRAnhON
§ 63.02 (T. Bornstein & A. Gosline eds., 1991)).
118. Parties often settle after they present the two salary numbers to the arbitrator. Both sides
continue to evaluate their position and may reach a compromise fearing their position is further
from the "correct" salary than the other side's position. See Rings, supra note 76, at 255.
119. See id. at 254.
120. The eligibility of second year players is determined based on time spent in the major
leagues. See Craig Neff, The 17% Solution, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Apr. 2, 1990, at 13.
121. The current rules do not allow arbitrators to choose a compromise figure between the two
proposed by the parties.
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past season (in terms of performance, leadership, and popularity with the
public);
(2) the length and consistency of the player's career performance;
(3) the player's past compensation;
(4) comparable salaries of other baseball players;
(5) the existence of any physical or mental problems which may
affect the player; and
(6) the club's performance.1 22
The parties present evidence relevant to the above criteria and arbitrators
have the discretion to weigh the evidence as they deem appropriate.1 23
Presently, the collective bargaining agreement specifically excludes
several topics from an arbitrator's consideration, including:
(1) the financial situation of the team;
(2) comments made by the press that may bear on the performance
of the player or team, except for any awards the player received for his
performance;
(3) any offers made by the player or the team before the hearing;
(4) the cost to either party for legal representation; and
(5) salaries in other sports or occupations.1 24
Since the inception of salary arbitration in 1974, a noticeable trend
has emerged. Players that are eligible for salary arbitration, even those
who lose at the hearing, receive a significant increase in salary. In 1991,
for example, 157 players filed for arbitration. There were only seven-
teen hearings and the average salary increase for all eligible players par-
ticipating in arbitration was 103%-nearly double the increase of non-
eligible players.125 In 1993, the average increase of the 118 Major
League Baseball players who filed for arbitration was $829,421, even
though the owners were successful in twelve of the eighteen actual hear-
ings. 126 Although the owners have held a slight advantage since
1974,127 the players' salaries have continued to spiral upward.
Originally, arbitration agreements between management and play-
ers provided that any club or player with two to six years of service in
the major leagues, and who had not reached a salary agreement, could
122. See Hopkins, supra note 68, at 311.
123. See id. Arbitrators often look at the midpoint between the two figures and then decide if
the player is worth one dollar more or less than that.
124. See id.
125. Chicago White Sox pitcher Jack McDowell earned an 814% increase in salary despite
losing his arbitration case. See Hopkins, supra note 68, at 328; see also Jerome Holtzman, Player
Salaries Uphold Wrigley Arbitration View, CI. Trui., Jan. 23, 1994, at C13.
126. See Ronald Blum, Players in Arbitration Were Big Winners, ST. Louis POsT-DISPATCH,
Feb. 22, 1993, at 6C.
127. See id.
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submit the dispute to arbitration. In 1987, the minimum service require-
ment was raised to three years by an agreement between management
and the players.
Generally, about one hundred players file for arbitration each year.
Most of these players end up settling with their club before the actual
arbitration. Historically, players have won about 44% of the arbitration
hearings.1 28 One possible explanation for this may be that arbitrators,
lacking the authority to exercise discretion to "split the difference" in a
particular arbitration hearing, often do so, in effect, by deciding how
often a player or management prevails overall.
Economists have speculated that the availability of an arbitration
alternative puts upward pressure on salaries. Because the probability of
winning in arbitration is historically close to 50%, club owners are gen-
erally willing to grant salary increases, at least up to the expected salary
increase the player might attain through arbitration. It is also possible
that much of the upward pressure on salaries attributed to arbitration
may be caused by the high salaries obtained by players who file as free
agents. The interaction between salary arbitration and free agency has
fueled an increase in players' salaries. When salary arbitration began in
1974, the average players' salary was $44,676.129 The current average
salary is more than $1.2 million.' 30 Theoretically, owners base free
agent offers on their perception of a player's future value to a new team,
whereas salary arbitration is designed to reflect the player's past contri-
butions to a team. 13' However, arbitrators must base their decision on
comparable baseball salaries; therefore, a player engaged in arbitration
bases his figure, in part, on comparable players' salaries, including sala-
ries offered to lure free agents. 32 This interplay of salary arbitration and
free agency has sent players' salaries soaring. Because of these rising
salaries, owners now seek to do away with salary arbitration,1 33 believ-
ing that it damages Major League Baseball's financial structure. 134
Owners typically parade their profit and loss statements to prove
that salary arbitration is ruining Major League Baseball. Although
Major League Baseball revenues have increased yearly between 1976 to
1994, television networks have experienced huge losses broadcasting
128. See ScuLLY, supra note 47, at 162.
129. See Rings, supra note 76, at 243.
130. See Bill Brashler, Boooooooooooooooo!; Let's Hear It for Pampered, Preening, Overpaid
Whiners: The Jocks, Cri. TRIB., July, 28, 1996, at C12 (stating that the average Major League
salary for the 1996 season was $1,176,967).
131. See Rings, supra note 76, at 259.
132. See id.
133. See Tom Verducci, In the Strike Zone, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Aug. 1, 1994, at 26.
134. See Steven V. Roberts & Jim Impoco, A Bronx Cheer for Baseball, U.S. NEws & WORLD
REP., Aug. 22, 1994, at 24.
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baseball over the past several years.' 35  In fact, ESPN exercised its
option to buy out its contract with Major League Baseball to cut its
losses.1 36 The end of these lucrative television contracts is expected to
decrease Major League Baseball's revenues by at least $200 million.137
Owners contend this revenue decrease will be a substantial financial
strain on Major League Baseball, and will ultimately force smaller mar-
ket teams out of Major League Baseball. Smaller franchises complain
that, because arbitrators cannot consider a team's economic situation or
geographic location,1 38 they are forced to match salaries offered by
larger market clubs. 39
Owners argue that the current system of salary arbitration, coupled
with free agency, leads to domination by larger market teams. They
contend that a pure reserve system maintains the game's competitive
balance. Their contention, however, is erroneous for several reasons.
First, the owners' argument implies that prior to salary arbitration, fierce
competition existed and larger market teams did not dominate. Yet,
between the years 1921 through 1964, under a pure reserve system, the
New York Yankees won the American League pennant twenty-nine
times, and the World Series twenty times. 40 In contrast, since 1976,
twenty different teams have won the American League or National
League pennant, with fourteen different teams going on to win the
World Series. Therefore, one could argue that salary arbitration and free
agency have, in fact, produced the most competitive period in Major
League Baseball's history.1 41
Owners also complain that arbitration and free agency lead to raid-
ing by larger market teams, and ultimately lead to fan disinterest. Yet,
135. See GREENBERG, supra note 47, § 5.01(2), at 374-75.
136. See id. § 5.01(2), at 222 n.55 (Cum. Supp. 1995).
137. See Mike Fish, Fehr: TV Contract Likely to Undermine Commissioner's Role, ATLANTA
J./ATLANrA CONST., May 29, 1993, at D7.
138. See supra notes 122-124 and accompanying text. Former Major League Baseball
Commissioner Fay Vincent believes the current system must change due to severe pressure placed
on smaller clubs. "How do you deal with a system where, if you're in Seattle, you have to pay
New York prices for talent [due to arbitration awards]? No other business in Seattle pays New
York prices-except baseball. It's absurd." Bill Brubaker, The Head of the Game, Faced With
Trouble, WASH. POST, Aug. 16, 1992, at D1 (alteration in original).
139. See Joe Strauss, Baseball Study: Owners, Players Must Cooperate, ATLANTA J./ATLANTA
CONST., Dec. 15, 1992, at C5. See generally Kevin E. Martens, Fair or Foul? The Survival of
Small-Market Teams in Major League Baseball, 4 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 323 (1994).
140. See Michael Isikoff, Bowie at the Bat, NEW REPUBLIC, Apr. 27, 1987, at 32, 35 (reviewing
BOWIE K. KUHN, HARDBALL: THE EDUCATION OF A BASEBALL COMMISSIONER (1987)). Looking
back further, between the years 1901-1919, only four teams won the American League
championship. Similarly, between 1901-1914, only three teams won the National League
championship. See CHARLES C. ALEXANDER, OUR GAME: AN AMERICAN BASEBALL HISTORY 93
(1991).
141. See MILLER, supra note 107, at 294-95.
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this incorrectly presupposes that big market team raiding of smaller
teams is a modem development in Major League Baseball. During their
period of domination, the New York Yankees bought the contracts of
many star players from other teams, particularly the Boston Red Sox.'42
Although this decreased baseball's level of competitiveness, the owners
did not seem concerned that this domination would lead to fan disinter-
est, at least as long as the trading owner reaped the market value of its
stars. The main difference is that under the original reserve system, the
money representing the true value of the player went to the "selling"
team. Under the current system, however, the money goes directly to
the player as free agent.
Another complaint voiced by owners is that arbitration leads to
large salary increases for many players whose productivity in the season
preceding the arbitration did not merit any increase at all.' 4 3 The owners
argue that salary arbitration places players in a "no-lose" situation, and
point to 1992 arbitration results to prove their case. In 1992, twenty
salary disputes reached arbitration.'" The owners won eleven of these
hearings.1 4 5 The nine winning players received an average salary
increase of 135%, and the "losing" players received an average increase
of 81%.146 It is no surprise, then, that owners want to eliminate the
salary arbitration system, even though they have won 56% of arbitration
hearings since the system was implemented in 1974.147
One way for owners to confront the arbitration system and the
harshness often associated with haggling over a player's value, is to
avoid it altogether. Players use the threat of arbitration to gain huge
salary increases.148 Fearing exorbitant arbitration results, owners feel
compelled to offer significantly increased salaries in an effort to settle
the dispute before it reaches arbitration. In 1993, the Cleveland Indians
adopted a different approach. To confront uncertain economic times and
avoid salary arbitration disputes, the Indians signed fourteen young
baseball players to long-term contracts during the 1992 and 1993 sea-
sons.' 49 The risky approach seems to have paid off. The Cleveland
142. See ANDREW ZIMBALIST, BASEBALL AND BILIONS: A PROBING LOOK INSIDE THE BIG
BusINEss OF OUR NATIONAL PASTIME 11 (1992).
143. See I.J. Rosenberg, The Money Game, ATLANTA J./ATLANTA CONST., Jan. 14, 1993, at El.
144. See Joe Strauss, Players Really Can't Lose in Baseball's Arbitration Game, ATLANTA J./
ATLANTA CONST., Feb. 25, 1992, at Cl.
145. See id.
146. See id.
147. See SCULLY, supra note 47, at 162.
148. See Mark Maske, Anderson: 438 Percent Pay Raise, WASH. POST, Jan. 19, 1993, at E8.
In 1993, Brady Anderson and the Baltimore Orioles avoided arbitration and agreed to a one-year
contract resulting in a 438% pay increase for Anderson. See id.
149. See Mark Maske, Orioles Seek to Sign Young Players, WASH. POST, Mar. 3, 1993, at Dl.
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Indians were the 1995 American League Champions, advanced to post-
season play again in 1996, and in 1997, came within one run of winning
the World Series. Normally, teams offer unproven players one-year
contracts. The Indians, however, hoped that by signing young players to
multi-year contracts, they would avoid the escalating payroll and
"bruised egos" inherent in salary arbitration. 50
While owners believe the players' salaries are out of control, the
players think that the owners collusively depressed their salaries before
free agency through the reserve system. Therefore, in the players' view,
today's increased salaries better represent a player's true market value
and allow players to recoup previous lost rents appropriated by owners
in a restrictive market.
The players also contend that the owners' cries of financial woes
lack credibility and that the numbers disclosed by the owners forecasting
financial doom were misrepresented. 151 A Toronto Blue Jays executive
remarked, "I can turn a $4 million profit into a $2 million loss, and I can
get every national accounting firm to agree with me."' 1 2 Turning profits
into book losses has only exacerbated an already stormy relationship
between the owners and players, and has increased the players' mistrust
of management's claims of impending financial ruin.' 53
Understandably, the players are determined not to return to a pure
reserve system. Salary arbitration and free agency provide players with
a bargaining position-the reserve system does not. Players also see
arbitration as a way to hold on to their "professional liberty."1 54 Players
reject the owners' contention that salary arbitration placed them in a
completely "no-lose" situation. According to the players, this one-sided
characterization by the owners does not consider the hard feelings salary
arbitration often leaves on both sides. The adversarial nature of salary
150. See Mark Maske, Yanks, Like Boss, to Be Reckoned With, WASH. POST, Feb. 28, 1993, at
D13. This is a risk on both sides. The team is guaranteeing money to unproven players. By
signing, the players miss a potential opportunity to cash in on bigger salaries.
151. See Richard Hoffer, The Bucks Stop Here: Spiraling Salaries and a Potential Loss of TV
Loot Imperil Baseball's Prosperity, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, July 29, 1991, at 46. In response to
owners' claims of financial doom, Donald Fehr, the players' representative, responded, "[y]ou
will go through the Sporting News of the last 100 years, and you will find two things are always
true. You never have enough pitchers, and nobody ever made money." Id. at 47.
152. ZIMBALST, supra note 142, at 62.
153. This skepticism about the owners' financial position escalated in 1992 when teams signed
free agents to contracts worth more than $230 million, including a contract to Barry Bonds worth
$43.75 million. See Tim Kurkjian, Dark Days of Baseball, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Dec. 21, 1992,
at 44. Things were no better in 1996, where the owner of the Chicago White Sox signed Albert
Belle to a five-year, $55 million contract, while at the same time lamenting about the increase in
players' salaries. See In Our View, supra note 27, at 410.
154. Isikoff, supra note 140, at 32.
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arbitration often alienates players from management. 155  The process
can leave players with the belief that their teams do not value their serv-
ices, and naturally, no player wants to play for a team that does not want
him.'
5 6
D. Free Agency
Jim "Catfish" Hunter's 1974 contract 157 with the Oakland Athletics
called for $50,000 in cash and $50,000 in a tax-free annuity. Oakland's
owner, the flamboyant Charles Finley, breached the agreement, paying
Hunter $100,000 in cash. Pursuant to paragraph 7(a) of the Uniform
Players' Contract, Hunter terminated the agreement and announced his
intention to play for whomever made the best offer. In December 1974,
arbitrator Peter Seitz ruled in favor of Hunter, who then signed with the
Yankees for $3.75 million over five years.158
The baseball labor market did not change dramatically until 1975,
when Andy Messersmith challenged the reserve clause. In that year,
Messersmith demanded a no-trade guarantee from the Los Angeles
Dodgers, who refused his request.' 59 Messersmith played the 1975 sea-
son without a contract. At the end of the season, he declared himself a
free agent. The Players Association filed a grievance on behalf of Mes-
sersmith and Dave McNally of the Montreal Expos, alleging that the
interpretation of the renewal period and paragraph 10(a) of the Uniform
Players' Contract was a legitimate contract dispute subject to arbitration.
The players interpreted the clause as a one-year contract with a one-year
club option. Not surprisingly, the clubs interpreted the clause as a per-
petual renewal. On December 23, 1975, arbitrator Peter Seitz ruled in
favor of the players.160 The decision effectively granted free agency to
155. See I.J. Rosenberg, Baseball: The Braves, ATLANTA J./ATLANTA CONST., Feb. 1, 1993, at
D7. One player agent explained "[elven the most thick skinned player can be [alffected .... Self
confidence is usually the most integral part of a winning performance. This process can destroy
it." Id.
156. See id. After the arbitration hearing between Terry Pendleton and the St. Louis Cardinals,
both sides left with bitterness. Pendleton recalled that everybody said he was through with the
Cardinals when he beat them; that was his last year there. I.J. Rosenberg, Memory of Cards
Hearing Is Still Sour for Pendleton, ATLANTA J./ATLATA CONST., Feb. 1, 1993, at D7.
157. Contrary to popular belief, it was Jim "Catfish" Hunter, not Andy Messersmith, that
became baseball's first free agent. See Jack O'Connell, Born to Be Free, HARTFORD CouRAr,
April 3, 1992, at Ft.
158. See DWORKIN, supra note 81, at 72; Al Stump, A Money Player; Ty Cobb Was a Peach
When It Came to Investments, Too, L.A. TiMEs, July 12, 1991, at Cl.
159. See DWORKIN, supra note 81, at 72; Jim Murray, Jim Murray: His Clout Hit Where It
Counts, L.A. TiMEs, July 14, 1991, at Cl.
160. See James R. Hill & William Spellman, Professional Baseball: The Reserve Clause and
Salary Structure, 22 INDus. REL. 1, 3 (1983).
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any player who played one year without signing a contract. 161
The arbitrator's decision made club owners fear the emergence of a
bidding war of monumental proportions. Therefore, the clubs negotiated
a free agency provision in the Basic Agreement with the Players Associ-
ation. Consequently, any player with six or more years of service is free
to negotiate with any team he chooses once his contract expires. 162
Thus, the free agency submarket of the players' labor market is the most
competitive of the three submarkets. One should expect, then, that free
agent salaries most closely approximate the market value of the players
signed.
II. DISCRIMINATION IN MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964163 constrains the powers
of owners in setting player salaries. Under a theory of Title VII known
as systemic disparate treatment, the statistical model developed in this
Article, along with substantial anecdotal evidence, show that racial dis-
crimination may exist in Major League Baseball. More importantly, this
Article shows that anti-competitive labor submarkets, like the reserve
system, perpetuate and possibly mask discrimination.
A. Statutory Framework-Title VII
The primary purpose of this Article is to report statistical findings,
carefully identify their assumptions, and discuss what the findings mean
to the construction of the labor market and on-going collective bargain-
ing negotiations. Although the primary purpose is not to establish a
prima facie case of employment discrimination, several legal issues
posed by the findings are considered. These issues, however, are quite
complex and deserve further analysis, which is beyond the scope of this
Article.
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196464 prohibits discrimination
in employment based on sex, color, race, religion, and national origin.
Title VII represents the federal government's first attempt to "establish a
national standard of fair employment practices," 165 making it unlawful
"to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge, or otherwise to discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, condi-
tion, or privileges of employment because of such individuals' race,
161. See id.
162. See GREENBERG, supra note 47, § 5.18(1), at 429. For the actual procedures involved, see
id. § 5.18, at 429-32.
163. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-e4 (1994).
164. Id.
165. CHARLES A. SULLIVAN ErT AL., EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 2.1, at 33 (2d ed. 1988).
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color, religion, sex, or national origin."1 66 The promise of Title VII is to
provide equal employment opportunities for all individuals. "The stat-
ute's focus on the individual is unambiguous. It precludes treatment of
individuals as simply components of a racial, religious, sexual, or
national class .... Individual risks, like individual performance, may
not be predicted by resort to classifications proscribed by Title VII. ' 167
This is true even where the generalization about the class is accurate, but
the generalization is not applicable to a specific individual.1 6
Several different categories of employers are amenable to suit
under Title VII. The Act defines an employer as "a person engaged in
an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees for
each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the cur-
rent or preceding calendar year .... ,,169 The requisite number of
employees is a mandatory jurisdictional requirement for commencing a
suit under Title VII against an employer;17 ° Major League Baseball
clubs employ the requisite number of employees to meet this jurisdic-
tional requirement. Moreover, Major League Baseball is engaged in
interstate commerce as defined under Title VII.17' Flood v. Kuhn172
stands on the thin slice of precedent regarding Major League Baseball in
the context of the application of antitrust laws to the labor market.
Flood is strictly limited to the application of antitrust law to Major
League Baseball and has no precedential effect on matters such as col-
lective bargaining rights1 3 and the application of Title VII.174  Thus,
Major League Baseball clubs are employers for Title VII purposes and
thus are amenable to suit.
An employee may bring a Title VII action against eligible private
166. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-e2(a) (1994); see McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792,
801 (1973).
167. Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 708, 710 (1978).
168. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, as originally enacted in 1964, afforded a remedy for
employment discrimination only to private sector employees. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub.
L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). The Equal Employment
Opportunity Act of 1972 amended Title VII to include federal, state, and local government
employees. See Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). Title VII also provides protection from
discrimination by employment agencies and labor unions. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(b), (c).
169. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b); see Bonomo v. National Duckpin Bowling Congress, Inc., 469 F.
Supp. 467, 470 (D. Md. 1979) (finding interstate commerce present); American League of Prof I
Baseball Clubs, 180 N.L.R.B. 190 (1969). See also Walters v. Metropolitan Educ. Enter., 117 S.
Ct. 660 (1997) (discussing what constitutes an "employee" for Title VH discrimination purposes).
170. See Bonomo, 469 F. Supp. at 470.
171. See American League, 180 N.L.R.B. 190.
172. 407 U.S. 258 (1972).
173. See generally American League, 180 N.L.R.B. 190.
174. See Flood, 407 U.S. 258.
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employers, unions, and employment agencies. 175 Moreover, submission
of an employee's claim to arbitration under a nondiscrimination clause
of a collective bargaining agreement does not foreclose the employee's
right to a new trial. 17
6
An interesting problem arises when a previous employer is accused
of discrimination, which may be the case with some of the Major
League clubs that have changed ownership. Courts have generally
addressed this problem by embracing a balancing test, weighing the
interest of the employee and the national policy against discrimina-
tion. 177 Courts generally hold previous employers liable for Title VII
violations when there is a continuity of operations. 178  This would
always appear to be the case in Major League Baseball.
There are several categories of employees who may bring a suit
under Title VII. After complying with the presuit administrative
requirements,179 a nonfederal employee may bring suit on his or her own
behalf, or as a class representative pursuant to Rule 23(a) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, unless the initial administrative charge was
filed by a member of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
("EEOC").' 8 1 The EEOC may bring suit, but not against a government,
a governmental agency, or a political subdivision.1 81  However, the
Attorney General may bring suit against these parties.' 8 2 A federal
employee may also bring suit, but only on his or her own behalf, or as a
class representative. A federal employee, however, cannot turn to either
the EEOC or the Attorney General for aid in the prosecution of the suit.
Title VII cases may be brought under two general theories: dispa-
rate treatment and disparate impact. This Article's primary focus is on
175. See 42 U.S.C § 2000e-2(b), (c). See generally Northwest Airlines v. Transportation
Workers Union, 606 F.2d 1350 (D.C. Cir. 1979), affd in part, 451 U.S. 77, 88 (1981).
176. See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 59-60 (1974); see also Gilmer v.
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991) (holding that age discrimination claim is
subject to compulsory arbitration pursuant to arbitration agreement in securities registration
application).
177. See Brown v. Evening News Ass'n, 473 F. Supp. 1242, 1245 (E.D. Mich. 1979).
178. See Trujillo v. Longhorn Mfg. Co., 694 F.2d 221, 224-25 (10th Cir. 1982).
179. For a helpful discussion and outline of pre-litigation procedures for federal and non-
federal employees, see C. RicHaY, MANUAL ON EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW AND CIVIL
RiGHTs ACTIONS IN THE FEDERAL COURTS A-19 to A-26 (rev. ed. 1984).
180. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)(5)(f)(1) (1994).
181. See id. § 2000(e)(5)(f); EEOC v. General Tel. Co., 599 F.2d 322, 326 (9th Cir. 1979),
affid on other grounds, 446 U.S. 318 (1980).
182. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6 (1982). The circuits have split on the question of whether the
Attorney General has the independent authority to institute a pattern or practice suit against a
public employer without the case being referred by the EEOC. Compare United States v. Board
of Educ., 581 F.2d 791, 791-2 (6th Cir. 1978) (holding that the Attorney General has no
independent authority) with United States v. Fresno Unified Sch. Dist., 592 F.2d 1088, 1094-95
(9th Cir. 1979) (holding that the Attorney General does have independent authority).
[Vol. 52:461
TITLE VII AND THE RESERVE CLAUSE
disparate treatment, although it will discuss some aspects of disparate
impact theory, particularly in the area of the use of statistical inference
as evidence. In a typical disparate treatment suit, employees allege that
they have been treated less favorably than their peers on the basis of
their race, sex, or membership in some other statutorily protected cate-
gory. The plaintiff is required to prove an intent to discriminate. 8 3 In
contrast, in a typical disparate impact case, the plaintiff alleges that a
facially neutral employment criterion disproportionately disqualifies a
protected class from employment, promotion, or benefit. Claims
brought under the impact theory do not require proof of discriminatory
intent. 18 4 Both disparate treatment and disparate impact cases can be
further grouped into systemic (involving adverse impact on members of
the protected class as a whole) and individual discrimination theories.' 85
Under a disparate treatment theory, Title VII proscribes salary dif-
ferentials that result from an intent to discriminate. Intent in the law,
however, is a slippery eel, difficult to define, let alone prove.1 86 In fact,
"unemployment decisions are frequently influenced by the stereotypical
attitudes of which even the decisionmaker may be unconscious."1 87 Dis-
parate treatment is the intentional use, subtle or otherwise, of race or
color to make employment decisions. "Disparate treatment ... is the
most easily understood type of discrimination. The employer simply
treats some people less favorably than others because of their race,
color, religion, sex or national origin. Proof of discriminatory motive is
critical although it can ... be inferred from the mere fact of differences
in treatment."'' 88
Under disparate treatment, intent is the focus. Actual direct evi-
dence'89 of a discriminatory intent is becoming harder to discover as
employers become more sophisticated. Rather, it is increasingly com-
mon to use circumstantial evidence to prove discriminatory intent. Typ-
ically, one claiming discrimination can make out a prima facie case by
showing a pattern of decisionmaking that reveals a racial bias or discrep-
183. See Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256 (1981).
Technically, animus is unnecessary. For example, an employer, despite his belief that he is acting
to "protect" women from hard physical labor, may still run afoul of Title VH.
184. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971); Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433
U.S. 321, 328 (1977).
185. See SuLLIvAN, supra note 165, § 2.2, at 38.
186. See id. § 2.1, at 35.
187. Id.
188. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977).
189. An obvious example of direct evidence was the formal segregation policy in many regions
of the South. See Su.LrvAN, supra note 165, § 2.3, at 40. Likewise, Major League Baseball's
formal ban on blacks would fall into this category.
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ancy. 190 In the past, parties have used either statistical evidence, such as
regression analysis, or several individual incidents to construct a case
based on a disparate treatment theory. 191
Such evidence will typically show a gross and long lasting disparity
between the racial composition of the employer's workforce (the
"observed") and what the composition should be had the employer
not discriminated (the "expected"). The expected composition is fre-
quently proven by looking to the racial composition of the labor mar-
ket from which the defendant could be expected to pick its workers.
Statistical evidence of systemic disparate treatment can be buttressed
by anecdotal evidence supporting the inference that the employer had
a policy of discriminating.' 92
After the employee establishes discrimination in the typical case
that relies, in part, on statistical methods, the employer generally
attempts to undermine the statistical evidence. It attempts to do so by
attacking the model itself, the database used by the plaintiff (both the
data collected and the variables used and unused), and the inferences
drawn from the statistical model. The employer will also generally seek
to fashion an explanation other than the unlawful criterion (e.g., race) to
explain any statistical discrepancy. If these attempts fail, the employer
will seek to justify the use of the otherwise unlawful criterion based on
the evidence that the criterion is a bona fide occupational qualification.
The employer shoulders the burden of justifying the challenged activity
or requirement by demonstrating its relation to bona fide occupational
qualifications ("BFOQ"s) 193 in disparate treatment cases, or business
necessity in disparate impact cases. 194 Such defenses embody the funda-
mental principle that Title VII does not forbid all types of discrimina-
tion. There are unavoidable standards for employment in certain jobs.
For example, only women may be wet nurses. Such standards are
BFOQs and have a relation to legitimate job requirements.
In disparate treatment cases, the BFOQ defense was intended as a
narrow exception to the general rule against discrimination. The criteria
for judging a BFOQ defense were developed in United Auto Workers v.
Johnson Controls, Inc.195 and Western Air Lines, Inc. v. Criswell.'96
190. See id. at 41.
191. See id.
192. See id.
193. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(h) (1994). The bona fide occupational qualification ("BFOQ")
defense is similar to the business necessity defense in disparate impact cases, but is harder to
prove. See United Auto Workers v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 200 (1991). Race,
however, is not an acceptable BFOQ. See id.
194. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431-32.
195. 499 U.S. 187 (1991).
196. 472 U.S. 400 (1985) (involving age discrimination).
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The BFOQ defense is written narrowly, and this Court has read
it narrowly. We have read the BFOQ language of § 4(f) of the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), which tracks
the BFOQ provision in Title VII, just as narrowly. Our emphasis on
the restrictive scope of the BFOQ defense is grounded on both the
language and the legislative history of § 703.
The wording of the BFOQ defense contains several terms of
restriction that indicate that the exception reaches only special situa-
tions. The statute thus limits the situations in which discrimination is
permissible to "certain instances" where sex discrimination is "rea-
sonably necessary" to the "normal operation" of the "particular" busi-
ness. Each one of these terms-certain, normal, particular-prevents
the use of general subjective standards and favors an objective, verifi-
able requirement. But the most telling term is "occupational"; this
indicates that these objective, verifiable requirements must concern
job-related skills and aptitudes.19 7
Under Title VII, the disparate treatment case is usually made out by
anecdotal and statistical evidence. Once the prima facie case is proved,
the burden of production shifts to the employer.' 98 As a practical matter,
in this type of case, the employer usually attacks the prima facie case
itself, eschewing the BFOQ defense. 199
Based on the regression results in this study, anecdotal evidence,
and past history of discrimination, Major League Baseball's reserve sys-
tem, as a term and condition of employment, may operate to perpetuate
and possibly mask discrimination based on race in violation of Title VII.
Statistical evidence, as well as anecdotal and historical accounts, indi-
cate the need to consider carefully the role and future of the reserve
system in Major League Baseball, if all parties are serious about eradi-
cating all forms of racial discrimination, "subtle or otherwise.""
This Article explores the statistical evidence of salary discrimina-
tion developed from our study of professional baseball salaries. Before
turning to statistical study, however, some issues posed by the use of
statistical techniques in employment discrimination cases should be
considered.
The use of statistical evidence to prove discrimination under Title
VII has an interesting lineage. In Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,2 °1 the
Supreme Court formulated what is now referred to as the disparate
impact theory of Title VII. Disparate impact cases typically analyze the
197. Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. at 201 (citations omitted).
198. See SULLiVAN, supra note 165, §2.3, at 41-42.
199. See id. at 42.
200. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 801 (1973).
201. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
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use of facially neutral employment standards that have an adverse
impact on a protected group and cannot be justified by business neces-
sity.2°2 In Griggs, the Court reviewed the requirement of a high school
diploma for employment as a power line repair worker. Plaintiffs chal-
lenged the degree requirement as discriminatory against African-Ameri-
cans and offered a model comparing the percentage of the adult white
male and African-American populations who were high school gradu-
ates. 03 The comparison showed that the degree requirement was not
related to job performance, 2° and in effect, had a disparate impact on
African-Americans.2 °5
After Griggs, those challenging employment discrimination used
several different statistical models. Among those courts have accepted
is a model identifying salary discrimination through regression analy-
sis. 206 In fact, multiple regression models are routinely used to prove
discrimination.20 7
The landscape changed dramatically, however, with the Supreme
Court's opinion in Ward's Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio.2 0 8 Although the
opinion is confusing, it is relatively clear that the Court sought to limit
the use of statistical evidence in Title VII disparate impact cases. Throt-
tling the use of statistical models, the Court required the plaintiff to
make a focused comparison of similarly qualified individuals to support
a disparate impact case.20 9 The Court also made it easier for employers
to justify an employment practice having a disparate impact. The Court
did this by watering down the business necessity defense and accepting
a "legitimate explanation" as a complete defense.21 0 Consequently,
plaintiffs noticeably lost more disparate impact cases.21' In fact, it
appears that in Ward's Cove, the Supreme Court came close to uniting
disparate impact and disparate treatment cases.
In response to Ward's Cove, Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act
202. See Dotharad v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 328-29 (1977).
203. See Griggs, 411 U.S. at 431-32 n.7.
204. See id.
205. See id. at 431.
206. See Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385 (1986); see also SULLIVAN, supra note 165,
§ 3.4.3, at 91-103. Multiple regression analysis is a technique that studies the relative weight of
two or more factors and can predict the value of a specific factor. See WEBSTER's NEW
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1913 (3d ed. 1986).
207. See SULLIVAN, supra note 165, § 3.4.3, at 91-103 (and authorities cited therein).
208. 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
209. See id. at 650-51.
210. See id. at 659.
211. See Joseph L. Gastwirth, Comment, STAT. SCI. 165, 166 (1993) (citing J. Cecil, Federal
Judicial Center (unpublished data)).
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of 1991.212 The 1991 Act preserved the Ward's Cove requirement-of
making a well-focused comparison-to establish disparate impact, but
resurrected the business necessity defense announced in Griggs.2"3
Statistical models, like multiple regression techniques, can help
develop a case of discrimination against an employer; however, courts,
and now possibly juries, may be reluctant to rely solely on statistical
evidence.214 Consequently, in disparate treatment cases, plaintiffs often
attempt to couple strong statistical evidence with anecdotal testimony.
Both types of evidence are present in this study.
Some of the interesting issues posed by the application of Title VII
to Major League Baseball include the treatment of the owners as a single
entity for Title VII purposes, and the extent to which fan preference for a
player's race may be taken into account in setting salaries. Both of these
issues are addressed below.
A difficult legal issue posed by the use of the data in this study is
the extent to which owners may be lumped together for purposes of
increasing the sample of players' salaries in order to make valid statisti-
cal inferences related to a single owner. A non-sports example high-
lights the concern. Assume that an investigator is interested in whether
General Motors discriminates against its mid-level managers as to terms
and conditions of employment based on race. It does not seem fair to
draw inferences from a sample that includes not only General Motors
employees, but also employees at Ford and Chrysler. But what if Gen-
eral Motors, Ford, and Chrysler have entered into a multi-employer bar-
gaining arrangement, 215 and the precise terms and conditions of
employment scrutinized under Title VII are part of the collective bar-
gaining agreement? Although still present, General Motors' fairness
argument against the use of all three employee bases to make statistical
inferences is not as compelling.
Moreover, on numerous occasions, Major League Baseball and
other professional sports have argued that they should be characterized
as a single owner for, among other things, antitrust purposes.2 16 Author-
ities have painstakingly detailed the cogent reasons in support of and
212. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
213. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A) (1994).
214. As previously noted, statistical significance does not equate with legal significance. See
supra note 45. Additionally, problems with sampling, clustering of data, and stratification pose
difficult statistical and philosophical issues for significance tests. See Paul Meier et al., What
Happened in Hazelwood, in STArSn1CS AND THE LAW 1, 15-34 (M.H. DeGroot et al. eds., 1986).
215. See National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1994).
216. See, e.g., Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n v. National Football League, 726
F.2d 1381 (9th Cir. 1984); NASL v. NFL, 670 F.2d 1249 (7th Cir. 1982); USFLPA v. USFL, 650
F. Supp. 12 (D. Or. 1986).
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against this characterization of a professional sports league.217 For
example, although General Motors does not need Ford or Chrysler to
bring its products to market, the Atlanta Braves do need other Major
League clubs to do the same. Those arguments are even more compel-
ling where the owners have acted in concert to impose a term and condi-
tion of employment on the labor market that is an integral part of the
collective bargaining agreement. 218  Additionally, unlike with General
Motors and Ford, Major League teams pool profits and share revenues.
Therefore, in these limited and exceptional circumstances, the grouping
of all players on the Major League roster for a given year is a valid
method of analysis. The conclusions reached in this Article, however,
were made with some caution and discomfort. For example, it seems
troubling that the employment decisions of John Schuerholz and Dean
Taylor of the Atlanta Braves are essentially lumped together with less
scrupulous owners and executives.
Those acquainted with the interface between antitrust and labor law
may well believe that the nonstatutory labor law exemption to the appli-
cation of antitrust law defeats any attack against the reserve system in
sports.219 More specifically, Major League Baseball is exempt from
antitrust challenges to the reserve system.220  These observations miss
the mark. The reserve clause in Major League Baseball constructs a
labor submarket that may perpetuate salary discrimination based on race.
217. See Myron C. Grauer, The Use and Misuse of the Term "Consumer Welfare": Once
More to the Mat on the Issue of Single Entity Status for Sports Leagues Under Section 1 of the
Sherman Act, 64 TuL. L. REV. 71 (1989); Myron C. Grauer, Recognition of the National Football
League as a Single Entity Under Section 1 of the Sherman Act: Implications of the Consumer
Welfare Model, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1983); Gary R. Roberts, The Antitrust Status of Sports
Leagues Revisited, 64 TUL. L. REv. 117 (1989); Gary R. Roberts, The Single Entity Status of
Sports Leagues under Section 1 of the Sherman Act: An Alternative View, 60 TUL. L. REv. 562
(1986); Gary R. Roberts, Sports Leagues and the Sherman Act: The Use and Abuse of Section 1
to Regulate Restraints on Intraleague Rivalry, 32 UCLA L. REv. 219 (1984). But see Lee
Goldman, Sports, Antitrust, and the Single Entity Theory, 63 TuL. L. REv. 751 (1989); Michael S.
Jacobs, Professional Sports Leagues, Antitrust, and the Single-Entity Theory: A Defense of the
Status Quo, 67 IND. L.J. 25 (1991); Daniel E. Lazaroff, Antitrust Analysis and Sports Leagues:
Re-Examining the Threshold Questions, 20 ARiz. ST. L.J. 953 (1988); Daniel E. Lazaroff, The
Antitrust Implications of Franchise Relocation Restrictions in Professional Sports, 53 FORDHAM
L. REV. 157 (1984).
218. See Copperweld Corp. v. Independent Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984) (holding that a
parent corporation and a subsidiary engaged in coordinated activity were a single entity and thus,
could not conspire to violate section 1 of the Sherman Act).
219. See Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 116 S. Ct. 2116 (1996) (holding that an agreement
among several employers bargaining together after impasse to implement the terms of their last
best good-faith wage offer is shielded from antitrust attack by federal labor laws); Meat Cutters v.
Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676 (1965) (holding that a multi-employer, multi-union collective
bargaining agreement involving restrictions on operating hours of food store meat departments is
protected from antitrust attack).
220. See Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972).
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The reserve system is a term and condition of employment. Under the
theoretical construct developed here, a player does not attack the reserve
system because it is anti-competitive; he attacks the system because it is
racist. In other words, Major League Baseball may well be exempt from
the Sherman Antitrust Act, but it is not exempt from Title VII discrimi-
nation claims.2 2 1 Moreover, the owners cannot defend their reserve sys-
tem against a Title VII action launched by the players on the grounds
that the condition of employment was agreed to by the Players Associa-
tion in a collective bargaining agreement. In fact, the players may chal-
lenge union activities that further racial discrimination.222
Additionally, some owners may attempt to justify any discrimina-
tion in salaries based on fan preference and appeal. The argument is that
the owner is not discriminating against a player, but merely responding
to consumer demand. To the extent that an owner attempts to construct
a defense against a discrimination suit based on this theory, it will be
resoundingly defeated in the courts. Race is never an acceptable
BFOQ.223
B. Previous Discrimination Studies
Several empirical studies have been conducted to determine
whether racial discrimination regarding salaries exists in Major League
Baseball. The conclusions are mixed with several of the studies subject
to serious challenge. A critical analysis of several pertinent studies fol-
lows in an effort to show limitations and discrepancies in the studies. As
the reader will observe, this Article's statistical study goes a long way in
addressing these limitations and discrepancies.
Using salary data from 1968 and 1969, years which predate the
arbitration and free agency submarkets, Anthony Pascal and Leonard
Rapping concluded that there was no salary discrimination against Afri-
can-Americans in any fielding position under the reserve system sub-
market.224 Using the same data set, Gerald Scully employed several
multiple regression equations that were desegregated by position and
race, and compared the resulting coefficients on African-American and
221. See id.
222. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1994).
223. See SULLIVAN, supra note 165, § 3.6.1, at 107. Race is specifically omitted from the
BFOQ defense in the statute. Courts have also rejected customer preference as a pretext to
considering race as a BFOQ. See Diaz v. Pan Am Airways, 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1971).
224. See Anthony H. Pascal & Leonard H. Rapping, The Economics of Racial Discrimination
in Organized Baseball, in RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN ECONOMIC LIVE 119 (Anthony H. Pascal
ed., 1972).
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white salary equations.225 Scully found that, when focusing on "more
experienced players," African-Americans earned less than whites.
Scully reported that, "to earn $30,000, black outfielders must outperform
whites by about 0.020 in slugging average" (ratio of total extra base hits
to total hits that Scully found to be a significant determinant of a
player's marginal revenue product).22 6 Significantly, Scully concluded
that for the average level of outfielder performance-where slugging
average equalled 0.450-whites earned 25% more than African-Ameri-
cans. He also noted that as performance improved, the wage gap
between African-American and white players widened. 2 7 Scully con-
cluded that there were discriminatory salary practices by race for hitters.
Using a sample made up of approximately 21% of all baseball play-
ers and 17% of African-American players, Robert Mogull concluded
that African-American hitters earned higher salaries than whites despite
showing no clear domination in overall performance. 2 8 From a sample
drawn from players in their reserve years in 1970-71, the results indi-
cated that the "most important factor explaining the variation in salaries
among Black nonpitchers is the number of years they played on a major
league team. 22 9 Among pitchers, Mogull's sample found that African-
Americans were superior to whites in terms of performance and sala-
230ries.  Mogull also observed that "those factors which individually
explain much of the variation in salaries of white pitchers and nonpitch-
ers also largely explain the salaries of Blacks"-evidence that African-
Americans were not the victims of discrimination.23'
Hill and Spellman examined salary data from the 1970's and deter-
mined that African-American hitters were compensated 20.5% more
than whites, but for efficient reasons-"black hitters outperformed
whites by a wide margin and also had more years of experience on aver-
age."2 32 The sample was drawn from players during their reserve years
in 1976 and did not include rookies. African-American pitchers were
found to be paid just over $1,000 less, on average, than whites, but their
white counterparts had lower earned run averages, more innings pitched,
225. See Gerald W. Scully, Discrimination: The Case of Baseball, in GOVERNMENT AND THE
SPORTS BUSINESS 221, 260 (Roger G. Noll ed., 1974).
226. Id. at 261.
227. Inferences could not be drawn for pitchers because the selected productivity variables
were not significant.
228. See Robert G. Mogull, Salary Discrimination in Major League Baseball, 5 REv. BLACK
POL. ECON. 269, 270-72 (1975).
229. Id. at 275-76.
230. See id. at 273.
231. Id. at 278.
232. See James R. Hill & William Spellman, Pay Discrimination in Baseball: Data from the
Seventies, 23 INDUS. REL. 103, 107 (1984).
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and more experience. The authors concluded that "[t]he portion of the
wage differential attributable to discrimination is less than five percent-
age points and indicates discrimination against whites." '233
Without disaggregating the population by submarket, Kevin Chris-
tiano analyzed reported salaries of 86% of hitters from 1977 rosters to
determine which variables influence salaries between African-Ameri-
cans and whites.234 Christiano discovered that experience and perform-
ance (specifically the number of home runs and batting average) were
significant in explaining salary disparities, yet the race variable was
insignificant at the 10% level.235
In 1988, Christiano analyzed 1987 compensation patterns using a
log transformation of salaries derived from 357 veteran Major League
hitters, with race as a dummy variable.236 Christiano found that African-
American hitters "are paid more than white hitters-even after the supe-
rior performances are taken into account"-giving little support to
claims of racial discrimination against African-American players.237
Even when separate salary functions for blacks and whites were esti-
mated to eliminate dummy variable biases, Christiano concluded that
"there is no consistent evidence of discrimination in the salaries awarded
to black ballplayers. 238
More recently, Slottje, Hirschberg, Hayes, and Scully explored the
possibility of salary discrimination in baseball using a technique new to
labor market discrimination studies, known as frontier estimation.239
This technique allows for the disaggregation of information concerning
233. Id. at 110.
234. See Kevin J. Christiano, Salary Discrimination in Major League Baseball: The Effect of
Race, 3 Soc. SPORT J. 144, 145 (1986).
235. See id. at 149. Moreover, since whites were coded as one (1) and the race coefficient was
negative, the author speculated that whites were at a financial disadvantage if in fact
discrimination did exist.
236. See Kevin J. Christiano, Salaries and Race in Professional Baseball: Discrimination 10
Years Later, 5 Soc. SPORT J. 136, 139-40 (1988).
237. Id. at 142.
238. Id. at 145. See Wilbert M. Leonard, III, Salaries and Race/Ethnicity in Major League
Baseball: The Pitching Component, 6 Soc. SPORT J. 152 (1989). Leonard divided the labor
market into whites, African-Americans, and Hispanics to determine whether pitchers in the major
leagues were rewarded with salaries commensurate with performance, or if race played a role in
1987. Leonard noted that experience, innings pitched, and earned run average determined salaries
in large part. Additionally, he noted that recent data indicating that racial- or ethnicity-based
salary discrimination did not exist among hitters appeared to be consistent for pitchers as well,
although the very small number of minority pitchers precluded direct inferences that
discrimination did not exist among pitchers.
239. See Daniel J. Slottje et al., A New Method for Detecting Individual and Group Labor
Market Discrimination, 61 J. ECONOMETRICS 43-64 (1994). For a discussion on the topic of
frontier estimation, see Dennis Aigner et al., Formulation and Estimation of Stochastice Frontier
Production Models, 6 J. ECONOMETRICS 21 (1977).
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wage deviations for specific labor market participants so that inferences
can be made as to the extent to which an individual baseball player
might be discriminated against, as opposed to how an entire cohort
might be impacted, on average, by an owner's propensity to
discriminate.24°
Using data from the "collusion years" of 1985-86,241 the authors
found that, while many players were paid a salary that was less than the
additional revenue the player contributed to his club, race was not a
"significant factor in explaining this wage inefficiency. 242
While frontier estimation provides an alternative to standard multi-
ple regression analysis, the authors relied on distorted data such as that
from the period in baseball history when a de facto reserve clause per-
meated the industry (that is, data in salaries from the collusion years).
Reliance on data from this time period and the lack of a media variable
casts some doubt on the significance of the authors' results.
Further, the non-frontier studies failed to recognize that there are
three distinct submarkets in the baseball labor market that vary in their
degrees of owner control over player salaries. Combining these distinct
submarkets may mask the existence of discrimination in one, but not all
of the submarkets. Also, with the exception of Leonard and Rai-
mondo,2 43 the previous studies failed to include Hispanics in salary data.
Given that Hispanic representation in Major League Baseball has grown
steadily over the years, this oversight is disturbing. For example, in
1987, the year selected for the study in this Article, approximately 35%
of minority hitters and 76% of minority pitchers in the Major Leagues
were Hispanic. 2" Although Leonard included Hispanics in his study,
his exclusive analysis of pitchers does not take into account the large
sample of Hispanic hitters.
240. See Slottje, supra note 239, at 43-64.
241. In 1985, sixty-two players filed for free agency, but no club pursued these players unless
their current clubs did not express interest in them. The Players Association filed a grievance on
February 3, 1986, alleging that the owners colluded to boycott the free agents. On September 21,
1987, arbitrator Thomas Roberts ruled that the clubs had colluded in violation of art. XVIII(H) of
baseball's Basic Agreement. As a result, seven players were given the opportunity to negotiate
with a new team without losing their existing contracts. The Players Association also filed
grievances on behalf of the 1986 and 1987 free agents. In August 1988, arbitrator George Nicolau
ruled in favor of seventy-nine players who were free agents in 1986, finding collusion in the 1986
free agency market. In July 1990, the owners were once again found guilty of collusion. A total
settlement for damages was reached in the amount of $280 million. See SCULLY, supra note 47, at
39-41; ZIMBALIST, supra note 142, at 25; see also HELYAR, supra note 49, at 332-63.
242. See Slottje, supra note 239, at 61.
243. See Leonard, supra note 238; Henry J. Raimondo, Free Agents' Impact on the Labor
Market for Baseball Players, 4 J. LAB. RES. 183 (1983).
244. See THE BASEBALL GUIDE (1988); $256,296,950: Baseball Salaries '87, SPORTS
ILLUSTRATED, Apr. 20, 1987, at 54.
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Another problem with the most recent studies24 that find no dis-
crimination based on race or ethnicity is that they rely on data sets
derived from the years in which owners colluded to artificially limit the
movement of free agent players. This de facto reservation of players by
their clubs would reduce the predictive power of the models used in the
prior studies because of the tainted free agency submarket. It is likely
that the previous studies' use of 1985 through 1987 salaries prevents
accurate measurement of the impact of performance and other variables
on salaries, in light of findings by arbitrators Roberts and Nicolau that
owners colluded to prevent free movement of free agents after the 1985
and 1986 seasons.
With virtually no bidding on free agents during the 1985-86 years,
players' salaries actually fell for the first time in more than twenty sea-
sons.24 Therefore, research that focused on the effects of the "competi-
tive market" on salary discrepancies by race and ethnic group for free
agents in 1985 through 1987 fails to accurately measure this effect when
the actual labor market reflected a reversion back to monopsonistic bar-
riers to free movement of players. By 1988, a state of normalcy was
restored, as free agents were signed and average salaries rose above
1987 levels.247
Yet another deficiency in other studies stems more from statistical
procedure than from data specification. With the exception of Slottje,248
none of the discrimination studies allow for the possibility that the effect
of experience on salaries could take on a convex or concave shape.
Squaring the experience term allows for the possibility that the lifetime
earnings profile of Major League players is convex or concave. This is a
common technique in labor market studies, where diminishing renumer-
ations over time are most often observed. As experience increases,
financial returns for workers eventually begins to decrease. This dem-
onstrates that some workers become less productive over time. Because
baseball is a rather atypical industry, it might be that for baseball play-
ers, as experience increases compensation, experience profiles actually
become convex, which indicates the payment of a premium for marquee
names. These intuitively appealing quadratic relationships are most
likely a common feature of the baseball players' labor market.
In many instances, older players sign free agent contracts late in
their careers for less money than they earned the previous year, while
245. See Christiano, supra note 236; Leonard, supra note 238; Slottje, supra note 239.
246. See DON N. MACDONALD & MORGAN 0. REYNOLDS, ARE BASEBALL PLAYERS PAID
THEm MARGINAL REVENUE PRODUCTS? 5 (May 1990) (on file with the CARDOZO ARTS AND
ENTERTAINMENT LAW JOURNAL).
247. See id.
248. See Slottje, supra note 239.
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other players seem to receive generous compensation packages based
more on lifetime performance than on more recent production levels.249
The former case reflects the likelihood that the opportunity or reserva-
tion wage for players in the twilight of their careers is still less than what
can be garnered in Major League Baseball. By focusing on experience
alone, any regression results miss these potentially significant and possi-
bly racially disparate relationships.
It is also somewhat surprising that past discrimination studies fail
to acknowledge television's rapidly increasing role in Major League
Baseball due both to coverage and to broadcast rights.250 At first glance,
it appears that while the magnitude of television revenues would help
determine salaries among all players, there would be little reason to sus-
pect differential coverage or willingness to pay for broadcast rights
based on the racial composition of various teams.2 5 1 After all, profit-
maximizing theory dictates that potential carriers of national or local
telecasts pay for rights in accordance with the perceived likelihood that
outlays can at least be recouped from advertising revenues; factors such
as race or ethnicity would not be considered under this theory. More-
over, owners of national television rights decide which contests to
broadcast based on the anticipated level of viewer interest. 252 Theoreti-
cally, if two teams are vying for playoff positions or are traditionally
popular nationwide, viewer demand for such a game would be higher
than for games between teams of poorer quality, regardless of the racial
makeup of the teams.
At least one study has purported to refute the notion that customer
249. For example, designated hitters as a class-often comprised of senior veteran players-
had the second highest average salaries among starters ($2,731,460) in 1996. See Salaries in
Baseball Average $1,119,981, supra note 34, at 2.
250. In 1971, total revenues from local and national television broadcasts were approximately
$40.7 million. By 1987, the total had grown to nearly $350 million. CBS agreed to pay $1.1
billion for the rights to telecast games from 1990 to 1993, while some teams have obtained
lucrative cable television contracts in recent years. See Ira Horowitz, Sports Broadcasting, in
GovRNmBmr AND THE SPORTS BusINEss 275 (Roger G. Noll ed., 1974); Meg Cox & John
Helyar, CBS Wins Network TV Rights to Baseball, WALL ST. J., Dec. 15, 1988, at BI; Peter
Waldman, Will Major League Baseball Go Cable?, WALL ST. J., Dec. 14, 1988, at BI; Laura
Landro, Yankees' Owner Weighs Cable Bids for Games Rights, WALL ST. J., Nov. 15, 1988, at
B8; It's a Whole New Ball Game, BROADCASTtrG, Mar. 7, 1988, at 27; Special Report; Baseball
1987: Baseball Rights Approach $350 Million, BROADCASTInG, Mar. 2, 1987, at 47.
251. This assumes that potential carriers of such games are profit-maximizers and receive no
"psychic benefit" from covering teams who employ fewer minorities.
252. As one local network research director pointed out, there is "an obvious co-relation with
the team's performance on the field" and ratings. See Robert Sobel, Network Picture Split: ABC
Says It's Losing Money While NBC Is Upbeat; Flagship Stations Predicting Hot TV Sales Season,
TELEvisioN/RADIo AGE, Mar. 2, 1987, at 37, 39.
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discrimination exists in Major League Baseball.253 The end result
should be that among local and national television stations, 54 television
coverage and revenues equally affect salaries for both white and minor-
ity players. Because each team can negotiate and retain local broadcast
rights,255 high-quality teams (measured by past win-loss percentages,
playoff appearances, and/or future prospects) traditionally attractive to
large numbers of viewers (such as the New York Yankees, Chicago
Cubs, and Los Angeles Dodgers) earn higher rates broadcast rights than
lower-quality teams or teams that reside in smaller media markets (such
as Seattle, Kansas City, and Milwaukee).2 56 Based solely on differences
in broadcast revenues and the related abilities to pay players,257 some
disparities in annual salary could be expected, but these should not
depend on race or ethnicity if minority and white players are of equal
quality.
The study presented here accounts for more than fifty Hispanic hit-
ters in the Major Leagues in 1987, and is the first to focus on both Afri-
can-American and Hispanic hitters and pitchers. Justification for the
inclusion of both groups stems from the conjecture that each group
experiences similar socio-economic difficulties outside of baseball.
2 58
Thus, any salary discrepancy survey must take into account the possibil-
ity that both classes of minorities might be victims of discrimination.
Working from the qualifying assumption that any salary discrimination
practices by management would be meted out roughly proportionately
against each group, the forthcoming multiple regression equations are
estimated with African-American and Hispanic players grouped into one
category called "minorities." Very little in the way of accuracy of mea-
surement should be sacrificed by this grouping.259 In fact, the results
will likely provide superior estimates of possible discriminatory prac-
253. See Paul A. Sommers & Noel Quinton, Pay and Performance in Major League Baseball:
The Case of the First Family of Free Agents, J. HUM. RESOURCES, Summer 1982, at 426.
254. For insight into what constitutes "local rights," see generally Horowitz, supra note 250, at
277.
255. See JESSE W. MARKHAM & PAUL V. TEPLrrZ, BASEBALL ECONOMICS AND PUBLIC POLICY
66 (1981).
256. In some instances, the effect of team quality and population may be positively correlated
with local broadcast revenues. See Horowitz, supra note 250, at 295-97.
257. This notion that greater ability to pay, particularly among large firms and in highly
concentrated industries, is prevalent in many studies. See generally Wesley Mellow, Employer
Size and Earnings, 3 REv. ECON. & STAT. 495 (1982).
258. See generally James P. Smith & Finis R. Welch, Black-White Male Wage Ratios: 1960-
1970, 67 AM. EON. REV. 323 (1977); SAR A. LEvrrAN ET AL., HUMAN RESOURCES AND LABOR
MARKE-rs: EMPLOYMENT AND TRAINING IN THE AMERICAN ECONOMY (1981); Glen Cain,
Economic Analysis of Labor Market Discrimination, in 1 HANDBOOK OF LABOR ECONOMICS 693
(1986); Cordelia W. Reimers, Labor Market Discrimination Against Hispanic and Black Men, 65
REv. ECON. & STAT. 570 (1983).
259. In fact, the grouping of African-Americans and Hispanics should aid owners in arguments
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tices, because more observations can be examined and more degrees of
freedom for error exist.
Many of the previous studies have concentrated solely on possible
discrimination facing hitters. The implied rationale for this concentra-
tion on hitters has been that African-Americans constituted a small pro-
portion of pitchers, and that accurate comparisons between African-
American and white pitchers could, therefore, not be made. Including
Hispanics with African-Americans in this study tenuates this dilemma to
some degree by increasing the sample size. This increased sample size
warrants direct comparisons with white pitchers. The expectations fac-
ing hitters and pitchers are so divergent that failure to include both occu-
pations in any study of salary determination could mask any possible
market failures associated with discrimination. Simply put, because an
individual hitter is but one of several hitters to perform during the game,
it might be easier to discriminate against pitchers over the course of an
entire season, where the individual can control the outcome of the game
much more easily than the former group. Furthermore, measuring the
quality of performances of hitters is much easier. Consequently, dis-
criminatory practices become much more difficult to conceal. To
account for these occupational differences, this study includes samples
for hitters and pitchers who were on Major League rosters in 1987 and
1988.
Some previous studies, including those by Mogull and Christiano,
failed to include all Major League players. As noted, Mogull used only
21% of all hitters and 17% of African-Americans in his study, while
Christiano accounted for 86% of hitters in his analysis of the 1977 sea-
son. Combined with other research that leaves out either hitters or pitch-
ers, few recent efforts exist that examine all players from any given year.
This Article fills this void with the following data set. For both
hitters and pitchers (hitters who pitched and pitchers who hit are
excluded), every white, African-American, and Hispanic player who
received a salary in 1988260 and was on a Major League roster in 1987 is
included in the sample. Those who received salaries in 1988, but were
in the minor leagues in 1987, are not included because the two leagues
are not comparable. Table 1 represents the total number of white and
minority players who were active in 1987 by selected position classifica-
tion, with the accompanying proportional makeup of each group within
that discrimination does not exist because of the lack of a ban on Hispanic players in professional
baseball.
260. See Murray Chass, Baseball's $2 Million Club No Longer So Exclusive/1988 Baseball
Player Salaries, S.F. CHRON., Dec. 14, 1988, at D2.
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each position in parentheses.261
A positive relationship exists between telecasts and attendance at
baseball games, and since a large percentage of annual revenues is
derived from attendance,262 this positive relationship would result in
increased revenues and ability to pay players. This assumption is sup-
ported by the research of Horowitz, who concluded that "[a] statistical
analysis of the relationship between the number of telecasts and baseball
attendance confirms the absence of any deleterious effects of television
on the gate. 263 Thus, if local broadcasts do have an effect on white and
minority salaries, holding constant broadcast revenues, it will be
reflected in the analysis.
Table 2 provides data on local broadcast rights and games telecast
for each team in 1987. These figures are used in subsequent salary mul-
tiple regressions to determine if local revenues and/or coverage contrib-
ute to differences in salaries among whites and minorities.26  Christiano
and Leonard used local television and radio revenues in their study, but
did not include local broadcasts. 265 This could be a significant omission.
For example, both the Chicago Cubs and the Atlanta Braves are owned
by the companies that broadcast their games. By concentrating only on
revenues, which for each of these teams is much lower than proceeds
from average broadcast rights (due in large part to common ownership),
Christiano and Leonard cannot capture possible significant effects that
the total number of games telecast could have on salaries among whites
and minorities.266 Certainly, inequality in local television revenues
could lead to variations in salaries among players with equal abilities,
but the effect of the number of games telecast is less obvious.
Perhaps of even greater consequence is the potential effect national
television broadcasts have on players' salaries. In 1987, the National
Broadcasting Company, Inc. ("NBC") owned the rights to telecast all
non-playoff, nationally televised contests except for eight regular season
telecasts carried by the American Broadcasting Company, Inc. ("ABC")
(which were excluded from this study). As had been the practice for
several years, all broadcast rights from nationally televised games were
divided equally among the twenty-six teams.267 Nevertheless, actual
261. See infra Table 1.
262. See MARKHAM & TEPLrrz, supra note 255, at 93.
263. See Horowitz, supra note 250, at 285.
264. See infra Table 2.
265. See Christiano, supra note 236; Leonard, supra note 238.
266. Scully contends that television could play a role in relegating blacks to outfield positions
where they are seen infrequently by viewers and, thus, paid a lower wage commensurate with this
"crowding effect." See Scully, supra note 225, at 244. Despite this contention, the effect of
coverage and revenues should not hinge on race if performances between races are equal.
267. This has been the practice since 1966. See Horowitz, supra note 250, at 302. Since the
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coverage by NBC varied greatly among the teams. Table 3 lists the
number of times each team was part of a nationally televised non-playoff
or exhibition game, as well as the total number of victories each team
accumulated and the total number of games each team finished out of
first place in 1987.268 Arguments could be made on economic grounds
that, if all revenues derived from national television rights are divided
equally among the teams, there should be no disparate effects on any
players' salaries.2 69 This logic is put to the test by including the total
number of national television telecasts for each team in all salary regres-
sions for each player on a 1987 roster. Players who retired after the
1987 season are not included;27° therefore, the test is to determine the
extent to which the 1987 telecasts affected 1988 salaries for white and
minority players.
C. Methodology
This Article examines the possibility of discrimination using more
recent and complete data than past studies, in order to more accurately
measure the impact of race and ethnicity on salaries. In particular, the
data analyzed is comprised of all players who were on the Major League
roster in both 1987 and 1988. We employed multiple regression analy-
sis to analyze the 1987 salaries of those players-a technique commonly
used in discrimination studies.271
The statistical model employed in this Article relates the 1988 sal-
ary of an individual hitter or pitcher to the individual's 1987 perform-
ance characteristics and to his team's attractiveness to national and local
television venues. The following equations were estimated:
For 1987-88 hitters:
Salary = bO + blexp + b2exp x exp + b3runs + b4rbi + b5hr + b6ab +
b7h + b8n + b9ltv + blO lrev + bll race
where:
1993 season, twenty-eight teams play Major League Baseball. Two additional teams, the Arizona
Diamond Backs and the Tampa Bay Devil Rays, will begin play in 1998.
268. See infra Table 3. Actual NBC telecast totals were obtained from a confidential source.
269. Hill discounts the possible effect of national television telecasts on salaries and marginal
revenue product calculations due to the equal sharing of these revenues. See James R. Hill, The
Threat of Free Agency and Exploitation in Professional Baseball: 1976-1979, 25 Q. REV. EcON.
& Bus. 68 (1985).
270. Players who changed teams after 1987 have the natural log of their 1988 salaries
regressed on the number of appearances their 1987 team made on national television. This is
based on the assumption that a player who changed teams after the 1987 season was paid a salary
reflecting his 1987 personal and team characteristics.
271. For a discussion of multiple regression analysis in discrimination cases, see SuLLIvAN,
supra note 165, § 3.4.3, at 91-103.
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bO = the intercept term. If all other variables equaled zero, bO
would equal the player's salary.
exp = experience in the Major Leagues measured in years. 72
exp x exp = experience squared. The squaring of the experience term is
done to allow for the likely concavity of the earnings profile.
This means that as a player's career progresses, we can expect
his salary to increase for a period, peak, and then fall over time
as his productivity decreases.2 73
runs = runs scored
hr = home runs
ab = at bats
h = hits
n = national television appearances by the player's team in 1987
ltv = local television appearances by the player's team in 1987
Irev = local television revenue and radio revenue earned by the
player's team in 1987 (in millions of dollars)
r(0-1) = race. A value of 1 is assigned to white players, 0 for minori-
ties. Thus, if the coefficient on race equals 100, it means that
being white carries a salary premium of $100, holding-all other
variables constant.
For 1987-88 pitchers:
Salary = bO + blexp + b2exp x exp + b3wins + b4saves + b5ip + b6er +
b7n + b8 ltv + b9 lrev + blO race
where exp, exp x exp, n, ltv, Irev, and race are the same vari-
ables used in the 1987-88 hitter's equation
272. The use of total years of experience as defined by Major League Baseball is superior to
the experience variable used in other studies, which typically define experience as the total
number of years in which a player played in at least one Major League game. The latter
measurement is imprecise if one of the objectives is to measure the impact of free agency on
salary discrimination. Players in the early stages of their careers are routinely brought to the
Major Leagues for the last few weeks of a season. Some players compete in a few games each
year for two or three years, but these appearances would not constitute full seasons. For a player
to accumulate one full season in the Major Leagues, he must be on a Major League roster for at
least 172 days during that season. Therefore, including players who actually have less than six
full seasons of experience in the free-agent classification would not provide accurate
measurements of the free agency market's impact on salary disparities. The only exception to the
experience term selected here is for players who were on a Major League roster for the entire 1988
season, but for less than a full season in 1987. In order to capture all players who received a 1988
salary, those players who began their careers in 1987, but did not meet the official 172-day
requirement that season, are included in this Article. This exception did not lead to any problems
with the empirical results. Additionally, the experience term was squared to capture previously
ignored intertemporal quadratic effects of experience on earnings.
273. The squaring of the experience term was not used in the multiple regression for players
with less than three years experience.
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wins = total wins by the pitcher
saves = total saves by the pitcher
ip = innings pitched
er = earned runs
The performance variables included in the model were based on
examinations of prior research and on personal familiarity with produc-
tivity measures that are typically employed in arbitration proceedings
and in annual selections of Major League Baseball's top performers.
Moreover, using these variables is superior to simple averages in at least
one respect: combining at-bats with hits and innings pitched with earned
runs, to create batting averages and earned run averages, respectively,
creates distortions that hinder adequate comparison of players. For
example, in 1987, Jack McDowell (then of the Chicago White Sox)
pitched twenty-eight innings and allowed six earned runs for a 1.93
earned run average. Roger Clemens of the Boston Red Sox pitched
281.67 innings, allowed ninty-three earned runs, and ended the season
with a 2.97 earned run average. Was McDowell a more productive
pitcher than Clemens? Focusing solely on earned run averages, the
answer would appear to be "yes," if no breakdown were given on
innings pitched and earned runs. Hence, the challenges created by
multi-colinearity are overlooked in favor of more precision in compari-
sons between players and racial or ethnic groups.274
Problems remain, however, with the data set. For example, the
variables selected for this study fail to account for defensive prowess or
for stealing bases; thus, players like Chuck Carr, who were undoubtedly
paid more for fielding prowess and stealing bases, may not be com-
pletely accounted for in our study. Furthermore, by not grouping play-
ers by position, the model used in this Article fails to reflect the varying
degrees of importance of certain positions in controlling the outcome of
a game.275 For instance, arguments could be made that catchers and
shortstops are paid more for their leadership abilities in terms of
manipulating defensive schemes and pitch selection than an
274. Previous tests for multi-collinearity between each variable revealed strong correlations
between some of the terms (e.g., at-bats and hits, innings pitched, and earned runs), yet the ratios
fail to present sufficient deleterious effects on the viability of each variable as an influential factor
in explaining salary discrepancies. Multi-collinearity may exist where one variable is a linear
function of another variable.
275. Ideally, the model should restrict the analysis to a specified level of innings pitched or at-
bats to alleviate this measurement problem, but this is not done here in order to allow for analysis
of all players. Since twenty-nine of the 252 pitchers in 1987 were minorities, it is likely that
reducing the survey to those players with a certain number of innings pitched might eliminate any
meaningful comparison of minorities and whites.
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outfielder.276
There are two justifications for excluding these possibilities. First,
since minority players make up a relatively small percentage of catchers,
pitchers, and middle infielders, it makes grouping by position very diffi-
cult and would, in all likelihood, prevent the use of regression equations
for minorities.277 Second, we assume that all players (except pitchers)
hit with some degree of proficiency to remain in the Major Leagues, and
hitting prowess tends to affect salaries more than defensive skill.27
D. Results
1. HITTERS
For the first inquiry-hitters from 1987 to 1988-the results were
mixed. In each submarket, the coefficient for race was positive, sug-
gesting a correlation that favored white hitters, yet no statistically signif-
icant evidence existed to suggest discrimination based on race or
ethnicity. 7 9 There was some evidence of discrimination, however,
when the arbitration and free agency submarkets were combined.
Within this grouping, white hitters earned $26,781.56 more than minor-
ity hitters, at a significance level of 0.18. This result should be cau-
tiously accepted because it falls below the most commonly accepted
significance level of 0.05.
At this point, it is beneficial to discuss what is meant by a level of
significance of 0.18. Contrary to how it is often described in the legal
literature, a level of significance of 0.18 does not mean we are 82%
confident that we have made the right decision in accepting or rejecting
the hypothesis. Rather, as a decision rule, a significance level of 0.18
informs us that there are about eighteen chances in 100 that we would
reject the hypothesis when it should be accepted.
In his classic work, R.A. Fisher suggested that one chose a specific
significance level as a rule of decision.280 One would discount evidence
that failed to reach the prior established significance level. Fisher sug-
276. The average 1996 salaries by position are: first basemen ($3,435,956), designated hitters
($2,731,460), outfielders ($2,350,206), third basemen ($1,841,775), shortstops ($1,745,613),
starting pitchers ($1,722,704), catchers ($1,690,470), second basemen ($1,647,443), and relief
pitchers ($537,646). See Salaries in Baseball Average $1,119,981, supra note 34, at 2.
277. Because of the small number of minority players at certain positions, disaggregation
would eliminate most of the degrees of freedom for error.
278. See Jack A. Chambless, Poor Underpaid Millionaires, WALL ST. J., July 5, 1994, at A12.
279. For example, in the monopsony submarket, white hitters earned $304.57 more than
minorities, but at a significance level of only 3%. In the arbitration years, white hitters earned
$13,443.73 more than black and Hispanic hitters at a 57% significance level. During the free
agency period, whites earned $35,467.44 more than their minority counterparts at a significance
level of 79%.
280. STATISTICAL METHODS FOR RESEARCH WORKERS (14th ed. 1970).
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gests a trichotomized approach to significance levels, by regarding any
test of significance that results in a larger than 0.05 significance level as
unpersuasive. He regards any test of significance that results in a signif-
icance level more extreme than 0.02 as clearly persuasive.
Fisher did not regard significance levels as decision rules "on
which alone to accept or reject a hypothesis."28 "The level of signifi-
cance is therefore best thought of as but one item of evidence, rather
than as the sole basis for a decision. ' 282 Thus, a result significance at
the 0.18 level should have some persuasive power, even though the
result is far from convincing. 283
2. PITCHERS
As Table 4 illustrates, minority pitchers from 1987-88 did not fare
as well. 84 With all pitchers grouped into the first equation, perform-
ance, experience, and television appearances all played a role in deter-
mining income. As expected, the earnings profile was convex,
indicating an erosion of market power for pitchers as they age. It is also
interesting to note that playing on a team that appeared on national tele-
vision was lucrative for all players. Each appearance added $21,102.12
to the average pitcher's salary. However, within this area of baseball,
meritocracy seems to wane in significance, because other than experi-
ence, no other variable was as lucrative to white pitchers as their race.
The premium paid to the pitcher who happened to be Caucasian was
$62,434.02.
Evidence of discrimination was more pervasive when the labor
market was disaggregated. In order to maintain sufficient degrees of
freedom for error, it was not possible to examine each component of the
trichotomized labor market.285 Therefore, the market was divided into
two segments-the first consisting of players within the reserve system,
and the second made up of pitchers in their free agency years. Tables 5
and 6 illustrate a pattern of discrimination against younger minority
pitchers who are unable to enter a free labor market. The same did not
hold true for older pitchers.286
For players with less than six years of experience, white pitchers
earned $67,942.86 more than minority pitchers at a significance level of
281. Meir, supra note 214, at 12.
282. Id. at 12-13,
283. See id. at 13.
284. See infra Table 4.
285. In 1987, there were only twenty-nine minority pitchers in all of Major League Baseball,
and only three with less than three years of experience.
286. See infra Tables 5 & 6.
[Vol. 52:461
TITLE VII AND THE RESERVE CLAUSE
0.01.287 For pitchers who could enter the free agent submarket, it
appears that only a correlation between race and salary exists, with
whites earning more than minorities, but not in a statistically significant
manner.
When the regressions were run for white and minority pitchers sep-
arately, a very interesting result was uncovered. Table 7 shows that for
the 217 white pitchers who performed in the Major Leagues in 1987 and
1988, performance and experience were the only variables that held any
great weight in determining their compensation.288 As expected, wins,
saves, innings pitched, and experience added to the white pitchers' sal-
ary, while giving up earned runs and getting old hurt their earnings. No
media variable was significant at more than 0.11. In that instance,
appearing on national television as a team added $10,637.21 to the white
pitcher's pay.
However, Table 8 paints a far different picture for minority pitch-
ers. Here, the only variable that was statistically significant for this
group was the number of times their respective team appeared on
national television. Every appearance added $112,190.96 to the average
minority's pay-over $100,000 more than their white counterparts.
Thus, it seems counterintuitive that minorities would be discriminated
against in terms of pay. In fact, minority pitchers who played on teams
that had a great deal of media exposure in 1987 did benefit financially.
However, this result may be explained using the theory outlined in the
next section.
E. Positive Profits and Discrimination
For economists, the practice of salary discrimination is antithetical
to the goal of profit maximization. The benchmark analysis of this the-
sis stems from the work of Professor Gary Becker. Becker has argued
that there is an economic price to pay, in the form of higher production
costs associated with lower than optimal productivity and lower profits,
when employers act on their propensity for discrimination and purposely
pay minorities less or refuse employment altogether.2 89 Becker points
out that, if an employer's rival has no propensity to discriminate, the
unbiased firm will enjoy measurably higher rates of output and profit in
the long run.29° Becker's analysis suggests that where competition is
intense, paying a premium for discriminatory tendencies effectively
287. Disaggregating the data did not significantly impact the value of the adjusted R-squared.
With all pitchers included, the R-squared was 61.94. The R-squared for the pitchers with one to
five years of experience was 60.89.
288. See infra Table 7.
289. See GARY S. BECKER, THE EcoNoMics or DISCRIMINATION (2d ed. 1971).
290. See id. at 39.
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places the discriminating firm in a precarious position relative to other
firms in the industry, perhaps even leading to bankruptcy.291
Becker's argument fits nicely into the economic structure of Major
League Baseball. If baseball owners attempt to maximize profits, then
choosing to discriminate against highly productive minority players
would be a costly mistake. A recent study found that every game a
Major League team wins adds over $349,000 in revenue to its bottom
line, and winning obviously depends upon player productivity. 292 If an
owner chooses to discriminate, the team will probably lose more games
as a function of fielding relatively unproductive players and, thus, will
also lose revenue.
A study by Gwartney and Hayworth confirms the legitimacy of
Becker's analysis applied to baseball. The authors analyzed the winning
percentages and earnings of Major League Baseball teams during the
1947-56 period. This was the period of baseball history after Jackie
Robinson's arrival in Los Angeles as a member of the Dodgers.
Gwartney and Hayworth found that the "top eight teams in terms of
'black player years' won 5.6 percent more of their games than did the
eight teams with the least representation of black players during the
1950-56 period. ' 293 Moreover, the authors discovered that "[t]he five
teams with the most black players won 58 percent of their games during
the 1952-56 period" compared to just 46% for the other eleven teams. 294
In terms of revenue, it was noted that teams willing to hire "as few
as four black players" earned, on average, over $200,000 more than
teams that were slower to desegregate their ranks.29 5 However, the
authors found that despite being able to substitute black players for
whites at lower salaries (the salaries of black players were artificially
suppressed by low pay in the Negro Leagues), less than half of the
Major League teams had employed black players five years after
desegregation.296
This unwillingness to profit from the availability of cheap, produc-
tive black players in the 1950's, along with the $62,434 premium paid to
white pitchers forty years after the integration of baseball, is not
explained by Becker's work. Economic theory fails to explain the per-
291. Indeed, marginal and average variable costs of production would likely increase in
proportion to an employer's discriminatory actions. If the employer operates in an industry that is
intensely competitive, higher costs easily lead to insolvency.
292. See Michael Hiestand, Algebraic Equations Factor Out for Players, USA TODAY, July 7,
1994, at 3C.
293. James Gwartney & Charles Hayworth, Employer Costs and Discrimination: The Case of
Baseball, 82 J. POL. EcON. 873, 876 (1974).
294. Id.
295. Id. at 880.
296. See id.
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sistence of salary or employment discrimination with its myopic
assumption that owners invariably act to maximize profits. Given base-
ball's extensive history of discrimination, it is possible, and even likely,
that owners could earn positive profits over time while willingly forego-
ing maximum profits to indulge some racist tendencies, even in competi-
tive labor markets. This supposition takes root in the works of Gerhard
Tintner2 97 and Armen Alchian,2 98 who created theoretical framework
grounded in the evolutionist "survival of the fittest" concept to explain
both successful and unsuccessful behavior of business firms.
Tintner suggests that, to assume that profit maximization is a pri-
mary goal or reality of business, is to assume that participants in the
profit-pursuing endeavor have perfect information and are capable of
solving complex problems that contain a host of variables29 9 (i.e.,
humans do not have the ability to satisfy either criterion). Relying on
this framework, Alchian contends that the "decisions and criteria dic-
tated by the economic system" are more important than the decisions
made by the individuals that operate within that system.300 Thus,
Alchian argues that, "realized positive profits, not maximum profits, are
the mark of success and viability. It does not matter through what pro-
cess of reasoning or motivation such success was achieved. The fact of
its accomplishment is sufficient."3 °
Tintner's and Alchian's work applies equally to the business of
Major League Baseball. First, the owners of Major League Baseball
teams have suffered from the problems alluded to by Tintner. That is,
no owner has perfect information as to the probability of whether a par-
ticular team will be a winning one, nor are they able to solve the prob-
lem of assembling the best team when so many variables, such as
coaching skill, fan support, weather, and team chemistry exist. There-
fore, without knowing what mix of players will be the most proficient,
the owner may wish to act on some racist attitudes by fielding a team
that is primarily white, or by paying minority players lower salaries for
reasons other than ability, experience, or marketability. If owners act on
these racial prejudices and, thus, act based on imperfect information, it
would not necessarily result in an unproductive team. Indeed, through
297. See Gerhard Tintner, The Theory of Choice Under Subjective Risk and Uncertainty, 9
ECONOMETRICA 298-304 (1941); Gerhard Tintner, The Pure Theory of Production Under
Technological Risk and Uncertainty, 9 ECONOMETRICA 305 (1941); see also Gerhard Tintner, A
Contribution to the Nonstatic Theory of Production, in STUDIES IN MATHEMATICAL ECONOMICS
AND ECONOMETRICS 92 (Oscar Lange et al. eds., 1968).
298. See Armen Alchian, Uncertainty, Evolution and Economic Theory, in ECONOMIC FORCES
AT WORK 15-35 (1950).
299. See id. at 17.
300. Id. at 19.
301. Id. at 20.
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good luck-a feature of business Alchian contends is prevalent-an
owner might discriminate and still have a winning team, if his white
players happen to perform well.
If the owners do not attempt to maximize profit, they can find a
window of opportunity to forego higher than "realized positive profits"
and practice discrimination. This practice could be measured by multi-
plying the premium the average owner is willing to pay white players,
by the number of whites in the respective cohort. In 1988, the owners
paid 217 white pitchers an average racial premium of $62,434.02, effec-
tively incurring costs that were $13,548,182.34 higher than if no dis-
crimination had existed.
If baseball is a unitary economic system rather than a collection of
independently acting owners, any owner could discriminate against
minorities within the system and not be punished financially if the sys-
tem has a built-in mechanism to assure revenue to even the most ineffi-
cient team. In many instances, owners have commented that baseball is
not a profitable pursuit, or that a key reason for team ownership stems
from the nonpecuniary benefits of running a club.3° 2 However, once a
team is purchased, the owner benefits by sharing in an equally-divided
pool of national television revenue, no matter how poorly the team is
run. In addition, teams share in the gate receipts of other clubs when
they travel to rival cities. Owners have recently come out in favor of a
more generous revenue-sharing plan, despite evidence from other sports
that equalizing payrolls may not impede the progress of wealthy teams
in gaining star players, and thus, earning more money as a function of
winning games.3"3
The mere suggestion of revenue sharing indicates that Alchian is
correct in asserting that profit maximization is not the objective of oper-
ating a business. If the owners agreed to such a plan, in effect, they
would change the "economic system" such that inefficient, poorly man-
aged teams would be insulated from ineptitude as long as they could
share in the success of teams who had "realized positive profits." As
long as less profitable teams share in this pool of dollars, discrimination
would be a less costly pursuit to the extent that the owners would now
be underpaying minorities with someone else's profits.
Our finding that a positive correlation exists between being white
and earning a higher salary in all three hitter submarkets (a statistically
significant premium of more than $62,000 paid to white pitchers and
302. For a discussion on the extensive nonpecuniary benefits derived from team ownership, see
ZIMBALIST, supra note 142, at 32-33; HELYAR, supra note 49, at 244-46; see also Mike Fish,
OWNERS N IT FOR MONEY, FUN OR BOTH, ATLANTA J./ATLANTA CONST., Aug. 19, 1994, at E6.
303. See Peter King, Deion vs. Dallas, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Sept. 26, 1994, at 66-67.
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even the $112,000 paid for every appearance on national television to
minority players), can be explained by the works of Tintner and Alchian,
but not by standard neoclassical, labor market theory. In the case of
hitters, the strongest correlation between race and salary-and the larg-
est income spread due to race-was found in the free agency submarket.
If owners were going to discriminate, it makes sense that this would be
the submarket where such favoritism toward whites would be uncov-
ered. After all, players in their first three years of service are generally
promoted to the Major Leagues due to satisfactory development in the
minor leagues, not due to owner preference.
Within the arbitration submarket, a third party, not necessarily the
owner, determines the final compensation of the player in question.
However, it is during the free agency period that owners are often
involved in bringing specific players to their organization through the
process of bidding on the available pool of baseball players. If the own-
ers wanted to pay a white player more than a minority player, not only
do they have more power in this market to control compensation, but
with average salaries of more than $500,000 in 1988, paying a premium
of close to $37,000 could easily be masked within such large payouts to
all players and allowed for positive profits to exist during that time.
This study shows discrimination against all minority pitchers. Yet,
the only variable that was statistically significant in explaining minority
pitcher salaries was the national television variable.
In addition to addressing the role of luck and chance in determining
the distribution of profits, Alchian pointed out the role that competition
plays in determining intertemporal profits. He suggested that "wherever
successful enterprises are observed, the elements common to these
observable successes will be associated with success and copied by
others in their pursuit of profits or success.
The fact that only twenty-nine out of 246 pitchers in 1987 were
minorities suggests that in a changing "environment," where the appear-
ance of occupational segregation can draw swift legal and economic
consequences, a rational owner would be inclined to pay a premium to
the most visible minorities on his payroll (in this case, the pitcher who
appears on national television) and still pay that pitcher a salary that is
discriminatory. Indeed, if ongoing discriminatory practices in overall
compensation exist, wouldn't an owner seek out one of only twenty-nine
participants in that highly visible portion of the labor market and pay
that person a salary reflecting his ability in order to mask the real salary
structure of baseball, which ignores productivity and experience in favor
304. Alchian, supra note 298, at 28-29.
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of anomalistic representation on the network telecasts? Alchian's dis-
cussion of "copying" successful strategies in the pursuit of profits is
compelling. If Becker's analysis is to be interpreted literally, paying
anyone for non-productivity characteristics would be inefficient, espe-
cially in an industry where productivity is the key to profit
maximization.
III. PROPOSAL
When the owners and players met at the end of the 1993 season and
throughout the 1994 season to negotiate a new collective bargaining
agreement, both sides proposed widely divergent options to replace the
current system. The owners' desire to regain control of the game, cou-
pled with the players' eagerness to maintain the status quo assured not
only a strike, but also the failure to play the World Series. As the own-
ers and players came closer to reaching an agreement in 1996, the need
to consider whether the market they construct perpetuates and masks
discrimination is paramount. These conflicting perspectives signal the
need for both sides to reevaluate their interests and consider new alterna-
tives.30 ' This call to reevaluate the terms and conditions of the labor
market is not blunted by the new collective bargaining agreement. This
part of the Article proposes a model of the labor market aimed at eradi-
cating discrimination and restoring a balance of power, all in support of
the long-term health of Major League Baseball.
A. Abolish the Amateur Draft and Modify the Reserve System
At the beginning of professional baseball, players moved freely
from one team to another at the end of each season.3 °6 This player-
hopping resulted in the escalation of player salaries and bidding wars
between teams. To significantly reduce players' salaries and to increase
revenues, 30 7 the owners convened a secret meeting and adopted the first
reserve rule on September 30, 1879.308
At roughly the same time, Hall of Fame player Cap Anson refused
to play against a team that had signed a black man named Moses Fleet-
wood Walker as its catcher. 3° On the heels of this overt act of racism,
the owners met not to punish the perpetrators of the act, but to join them.
305. Several of the suggestions in this Article are similar to proposals contained in the report of
the Baseball Economic Study Committee. For a discussion of the report, see GREENBERG, supra
note 47, § 5.20(2), at 255-56 (Cum. Supp. 1995).
306. See Frederick N. Donegan, Examining the Role of Arbitration in Professional Baseball, 1
SPORTS LAW. J. 183, 184 (1994).
307. See id.
308. See DWORKIN, supra note 81, at 10.
309. See Scully, supra note 225, at 225; Lonnie White, Morning Briefing: The Barrier Had
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In yet another "gentlemen's agreement," the owners agreed to discrimi-
nate against African-Americans by not signing them to professional
baseball contracts.
It is not surprising that similar racist collusion could happen again.
Under the present system, a player is drafted in the amateur draft with no
opportunity to test the market by seeking competing bids. A player also
has no meaningful choice if drafted by someone he perceives to be
racist. Moreover, the number of rounds in the draft may exceed thirty,
with the teams selecting players until they have tapped out the present
labor pool. Consequently, a player selected in the amateur draft does not
know how much his services would bring on the market. If the player
does not know what his market value is, then an owner may exploit the
player. Coupling an amateur draft with a six-year minor league program
and a three-year reserve rule in the Major Leagues compounds this prob-
lem. Thus, the current labor submarket is anti-competitive and provides
a potential breeding ground for discrimination, which is unchecked by
market forces.
The traditional justifications for the reserve rule ring hollow in light
of historical facts.31° However, one persuasive argument in support of a
reserve rule is that it permits a team to recoup its developmental costs
incurred on behalf of a player. Unlike other major sports, Major League
Baseball maintains a complex minor league system. Major League
teams sink huge amounts of funding into scouting, personal instruction
for players, and minor league programs. To prevent free-rider problems,
a team must be able to protect its investment in a player and recoup its
costs. The problem, of course, is that the traditional reserve system may
propagate discrimination based on race.
Although the tension between recoupment of costs by owners and
protecting players from discrimination may seem intractable, there is a
solution. This proposal would keep intact a reserve system in Major
League Baseball and abolish the amateur draft. Abolishing the draft per-
mits a player to test the market and to sign with owners with good repu-
tations for dealing with minorities. Once a player gathers that
information, signing under some form of reserve system should not pose
a problem of discrimination, so long as the reserve period is reasonable
in light of all the circumstances.
B. Eliminate Arbitration
The theories of labor market discrimination as applied to Major
Long Been Broken, L.A. TimS, Feb. 17, 1993, at C2; Stig Jantz, Hidden History Hall of Famer
Cap Anson Was Baseball's Best Player and Most Strident Racist, SPORT, May 1993, at 70.
310. See supra text accompanying notes 39-46.
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League Baseball are straightforward. In the absence of competition for
labor inputs, owners who derive some "psychic benefits" from discrimi-
nation will pay minorities salaries that are less than what their perform-
ances warrant and less relative to those of white players. If monopsony
power were eliminated to some degree, salaries for all players could be
expected to rise and be commensurate with productivity. Teams would
no longer appropriate rents from specific training, since other teams
could bid for player services and owners would not be able to afford
discriminatory payment schemes. The tests of these theoretical predic-
tions provide no conclusive evidence that discrimination against minori-
ties existed before the reserve clause was altered, yet empirical evidence
support the hypothesis that minority players are at least better off under
a scheme of competitive labor markets.
But what about players caught between monopsonistic exploitation
and freedom to move? While each of the previous studies provides a
foundation for further research, each fails to capture the true labor mar-
ket structure many players face. This is because there exists a third
group of players not strictly bound by the remnants of the reserve clause,
but who have yet to put in the years necessary to become free agents-
players who have qualified or will qualify for final-offer salary arbitra-
tion, but are not free to change teams.
As noted, final-offer arbitration (although it predated free agency)
did not play a significant role in driving salaries toward marginal reve-
nue product for players until the new free agency market was created
that assisted arbitrators in making salary decisions. 311  Therefore,
because arbitration has become such an influential tool for players in
seeking salary increases, omitting the last segment of this "quasi-
trichotomized labor market" could distort any study on the effect labor
market changes have on salary disparities. This is especially true since
the rights afforded players in this segment of the labor market are often
quite different from those for free agents and players operating under the
reserve rule.
Although the system of final-offer arbitration recently has under-
gone some changes, during the statistical years selected for this study, a
player who had completed at least three full seasons in the Major
Leagues could file for salary arbitration upon expiration of his most
recent contract.312 Under this system, the player and his team's manage-
311. See supra text accompanying notes 104-07; see also JACK SANDS & PETER GAMMONS,
COMING APART AT THE SEAMS 60-61 (1993).
312. The cutoff was changed from two years to three years as a result of an agreement between
the players and owners in 1988, which stemmed from the issues that arose during the 1985
players' strike. See GREENBERG, supra note 47, § 5.17, at 423.
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ment present their salary demands and offers, along with supporting evi-
dence, such as highlighted performance statistics, which assist
arbitrators in selecting one of the two proposed salaries. The arbitrator
or panel of arbitration is not at liberty to "split the difference" 313 in mak-
ing his/their final decision. However, players with three to six years of
experience who "lose" their hearings almost always receive salaries
greater than what they received in previous seasons. As MacDonald and
Reynolds point out, "losing arbitration is not significant, confirming the
general impression that players eligible for salary arbitration have little
downside risk and good upside potential from arbitration." '314 MacDon-
ald and Reynolds also found that arbitration has "a stronger independent
effect on salaries than the much-publicized free agency. '"315
Incorporating this segment of the baseball players' market into the
model constructed in this Article has some intuitive appeal. If a player
can file for salary arbitration, he will assumably receive an award com-
mensurate with economic factors (such as performance) if arbitrators
are, in fact, impartial and base their decisions on these variables.316 The
question then becomes: what are the key determinants of salaries for
white and minority baseball players who are eligible for arbitration, but
not free agency? The answer should be that players of different racial
and ethnic groups will be evaluated based on similar productivity char-
acteristics. Thus, including all three segments of the baseball players'
labor market in the model allows detailed examination of the degree to
which white and minority players are paid in accordance with perform-
ance, experience, and media attractiveness under monopsonistic, free-
market, and third-party influences.
In light of recent studies that claim salary discrimination does not
exist in Major League Baseball, the question arises whether previous
studies accurately reflected the structural changes that have taken place
in baseball in accounting for possible divergent outcomes when deter-
mining salaries among whites, blacks, and Hispanics. The answer
appears to be that they do not. Acknowledging the growing influence of
the media in baseball and the intertemporal trichotomization of the play-
ers' labor market raises the possibility that salary discrepancies based on
nonperformance measures may exist.
Another alternative to the current salary arbitration system is to
modify the process. The owners have proposed that three arbitrators
313. Diana Knude, Baseball's Being Very Good to Him, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Mar. 11,
1990, at 1H (quoting Gerald Scully).
314. MACDONALD & REYNOLDS, supra note 246, at 17-18.
315. Id. at 3.
316. MacDonald and Reynolds cite recent evidence that "final-offer arbitrators chose the offer
closest to the appropriate award." Id. at 18 n.17.
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hear a dispute. Presently, if either side is unhappy with an arbitrator's
decision, that arbitrator is fired. For example, the owners fired Peter
Seitz after the Messersmith/McNally decision. Not surprisingly, since
arbitration's inception, both sides have won almost equal numbers of
hearings. An arbitrator should objectively base his decision on the infor-
mation presented at the hearing, and not with an eye on job security. If
an arbitrator fears dismissal for his decision, he cannot render an impar-
tial decision; therefore, an arbitrator should serve a specified limited
term to minimize his interest in the outcome.
Ironically, the owners originally proposed salary arbitration. They
apparently did not foresee the interplay of salary arbitration with free
agency, which led to escalating salaries. Since the two systems are
based on different criteria, free agent salaries should be excluded from
salary arbitration. However, given the impact of free agency on arbitra-
tion awards, this proposal may be too late to be effective.
Based on these deficiencies with the arbitration system, this Article
proposes to abolish salary arbitration. Eliminating the mandatory draft,
shortening the reserve period, and expanding the right to free agency
would significantly reduce any negative effect on players from the
removal of arbitration. Furthermore, owners are better off, since under
the present arbitration system, an owner has no right to refuse to pay a
salary awarded through arbitration.
C. Expand Free Agency
Former Oakland Athletics owner Charlie Finley believed players'
escalating salaries would lead to Major League Baseball's extinction,
and suggested opening up free agency to all players.317 Some have
given credence to this idea under the theory of supply and demand.
Accordingly, increasing the number of players eligible for free agency
would work as an artificial salary cap, and decelerate the current pace of
escalating players' salaries.318 By increasing the number of free agency
candidates, "salaries would have to accommodate what the market
would bear." '319 If the theory holds, the market would ultimately correct
itself. As their financial situation worsens, owners would not bid as vig-
orously for free agents; thus, free agent salaries would level off. As an
added benefit, since free agent salaries set the market for salary arbitra-
317. See HELYAR, supra note 49, at 197. When Charlie Finley was asked in 1992 if he wanted
to own a Major League Baseball team, Finley replied, "[d]efinitely not. I would not want to go
bankrupt." Franz Lidz, Charlie Finley, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Aug. 10, 1992, at 5, 6.
318. See Michael K. Ozanian & Stephen Taub, Big Leagues, Big Business, FIN. WORLD, July
7, 1992, at 35.
319. Id.
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tion awards, those awards would also level off.32 0
These arguments are sound and support an expanded free agency
market. Restricted supplies of shortstops or left-handed set-up men
result in the high bidding of salaries for such services. Expanding free
agency will reduce salaries and should help to root out the discrimina-
tion. Racial discrimination, which can be hidden in an anti-competitive
market, can be exposed and its consequences ameliorated in a market
more closely approximating a free market.
D. Rejection of a Salary Cap
For the first time since 1904, Major League Baseball failed to
showcase its two best teams when the 1994 World Series was canceled
by twenty-six of twenty-eight owners.321 Ostensibly, the Fall Classic
fell victim to the owners' demand that players accept a salary cap, like
professional football and basketball players. Meanwhile, the National
Football League ("NFL"), faced with similar problems, announced a set-
tlement of their long-standing labor dispute. Under the settlement, the
NFL introduced a salary cap that becomes effective when 67% of the
NFL's gross revenues goes to player salaries.322 Once it reaches that
point, the salary cap limits the amount teams can spend on salaries to
64% of their gross revenues.323
It may not be appropriate, however, to compare the NFL to Major
League Baseball. First, football clubs draw most of their revenues from
national television contracts, which they share equally.324 In contrast,
while Major League Baseball teams share national television revenue,
larger market teams also generate sizable incomes from local television
and radio sources, which they do not share with other teams. The new
collective bargaining agreement modestly changes this relationship.
This creates an imbalance unknown to the NFL. Second, since owners
want to recoup their investment,325 Major League Baseball expends
much of its revenue on player development through its minor league
system. In contrast, the NFL relies upon college football as their minor
league to develop its players.
Richard Ravitch, former chief negotiator for the owners, unsuccess-
320. See id.
321. Baltimore Orioles owner Peter Angelos and Cincinnati Reds owner Marge Schott refused
to sign the document that ended the 1994 season.
322. See Steve Berkowitz & Christine Brennan, Poring Over Fine Points in NFL Pact; Salary
Cap Outlined, WASH. POST, Dec. 24, 1992, at ID.
323. See id.
324. See Ken Rosenthal, Another Voice NFL-Style Compromise No Blueprint for Baseball,
ATLANTA J./ATLANTA CONST., Dec. 25, 1992, at H2.
325. See ScuLLY, supra note 47, at 123.
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fully sought to eliminate salary arbitration and adopt a salary cap. He
urged the players to look at current numbers and consider the future of
Major League Baseball.326 Donald Fehr, representing the players,
responded by saying, "[p]eople talk about what the game is like, and
what we have [to] do [to] make sure the game is in good shape in 2010.
Well, that may be. But I don't have many clients who think they'll be
playing in the year 2010.11327 Fehr believes that since salaries are deter-
mined by overall revenue, they would automatically adjust if the reve-
nues decreased.328
Players are unlikely to approve a salary cap until they are con-
vinced that Major League Baseball's financial situation is as bleak as the
owners claim, and unless there is no other method to confront the
alleged problem.3 29 Fehr believes that the owners should get their own
"house" in order before demanding that players sacrifice their
salaries.33°
What Fehr and Ravitch fail to mention when assessing the impact
of a salary cap on the game of baseball, is the deleterious effect any cap
will have on the salaries of players affected by discriminatory remunera-
tions. A salary cap would act to exacerbate salary discrimination in
baseball for one salient reason: monopsonization of a labor market
affords employers with discriminatory tendencies the opportunity to
practice discrimination without worrying about other employers snatch-
ing up the most productive players, regardless of their race. Since a
salary cap truncates a player's ability to be geographically mobile, the
player must try to "fit" under the cap by either accepting his current
team's best offer, or the best offer of teams who still have funds under
the cap. This quasi-reserve system is precisely the condition Becker
alluded to when he argued that monopsony power increases, rather than
decreases, discrimination, since minorities have fewer opportunities to
shop their services around to the highest bidder.33'
The 1996 agreement does not include a salary cap, but does include
a modest luxury tax on the five highest salaries above $51 million. In
theory, the tax poses similar potential discriminatory opportunities and
326. See Point/Counterpoint Owners Seek Partnership but Players Are Wary, ATLANTA J./
ATLANTA CONST., Feb. 17, 1993, at G3.
327. Id.
328. See id.
329. See Ross Newhan, At Least Baseball Has Cue, L.A. Tivms, Jan. 8, 1993, at Cl.
330. See id. Fehr points to Major League Baseball's judicially-created antitrust exemption
status as one of the problems confounding the negotiations. Without the exemption, the federal
government could place more pressure on the owners in negotiation with the players.
331. See BECKER, supra note 289, at 110.
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should be avoided; however, the actual tax is so modest that it will have
little effect on the labor market.
E. Reject Revenue Sharing Among Clubs
Revenue sharing proposals force larger market clubs to share local
broadcasting revenues with smaller market teams, thus subsidizing the
latter's operations. The larger market teams balk at this idea, since it
cuts directly into their profits. In their view, revenue sharing among
teams forces financially stronger teams to support weaker ones. Accord-
ing to former Major League pitcher Jim Kaat, revenue sharing is a form
of socialism with no guarantee that small market owners would use the
revenue to improve their clubs.332 Charlie Finley saw revenue sharing
as the inevitable solution if teams from smaller markets are expected to
survive and to be competitive.333 Revenue sharing proposals call the
owners' perceived bluff on the issue of whether they have the best inter-
ests of the game at heart.
As previously discussed, the 1996 agreement provides that teams
will share local television revenues, that the top-revenue teams will
transfer revenue to the lower-revenue teams, and that players will con-
tribute a modest percentage of their salaries to them. There is no assur-
ance, however, that the money will be used by lower-revenue teams to
increase their competitiveness.
It may appear that the players are neutral regarding revenue sharing
among teams. Revenue sharing may seem to cost players little, how-
ever, revenue sharing forces financially strong teams to subsidize the
operations of financially weaker teams. As a result, revenue sharing
might act to exacerbate salary discrimination in baseball, since employ-
ers with discriminatory tendencies have the opportunity to practice dis-
crimination even if such acts are inefficient and reduce revenues. This is
true because someone else-another owner-is paying the costs associ-
ated with the discrimination.
IV. CONCLUSION
The question of salary discrimination on the basis of race or ethnic-
ity appears to be far from a dead issue. The evidence provided in this
Article suggests that salary determinations do, in fact, vary by race and
ethnic classifications when accounting for the sweeping changes that
have taken place in the structure of the players labor market during the
past fifteen years, and the substantial increase in television revenues.
332. Interview with Jim Kaat on ESPN Baseball Tonight (Aug. 19, 1994).
333. See Lidz, supra note 317.
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The parties to the collective bargaining agreement in Major League
Baseball should reassess the terms constructing the labor market in the
1996 agreement, in light of highly significant evidence of discrimina-
tion. These terms of employment should be carefully scrutinized in an
effort to uncover conscious and unconscious discrimination in setting
salaries in Major League Baseball. Until a frank assessment of the racial
impact of the terms of the labor market in Major League Baseball is
undertaken, Major League Baseball's sordid past regarding race cannot
be relegated to the comers of history.
TABLE 1. RACIAL/fETHNIC COMPOSITION OF MAJOR LEAGUE
BASEBALL IN 1987
Racial/Ethnic
Group Hitters Pitchers Total
White 249 223 472
(60.1%) (88.5%) (71.8%)
Minority 165 29 194
(39.9%) (11.5%) (29.1%)
Total 414 252 666
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TABLE 2. 1987 LOCAL TELEVISION BROADCAST RIGHTS AND TOTAL
TELECASTS (HOME AND AWAY COMBINED)
Rights
Rank (in millions
(#) Team of dollars) Telecasts
1 New York Yankees 14.80 75
2 New York Mets 9.30 75
3 Philadelphia Phillies 6.10 90
4 Toronto Blue Jays 4.68 35
5 California Angels 4.40 50
6 Pittsburgh Pirates 3.92 45
7 Los Angeles Dodgers 3.85 46
8 Texas Rangers 3.80 60
9 Houston Astros 3.75 74
10 Montreal Expos 3.60 44
11 Baltimore Orioles 3.56 40
12 Boston Red Sox 3.51 75
13 Cleveland Indians 3.50 60
14 Chicago White Sox 3.30 67
15 Detroit Tigers 3.30 45
16 Kansas City Royals 3.00 45
17 Chicago Cubs 2.90 150
18 Minnesota Twins 2.73 68
19 San Francisco Giants 2.65 38
20 Cincinnati Reds 2.30 46
21 Oakland Athletics 2.20 33
22 Milwaukee Brewers 2.17 60
23 St. Louis Cardinals 2.16 44
24 San Diego Padres 2.12 49
25 Atlanta Braves 1.79 145
26 Seattle Mariners 1.60 62
SOURCE: Robert Sobel, Network Picture Split: ABC Says It's Losing Money, While NBC Is Upbeat;
Flagship Stations Predicting Hot TV Sales Season, TiVtilsjoN/RADio AGE, Mar. 2, 1987, at 37.
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TABLE 3. 1987 NATIONALLY TELEVISED BASEBALL GAMES BY THE
NATIONAL BROADCASTING COMPANY, INC.
Total
Team appearances Wins GB
1. Chicago Cubs 11 76 181h
2. Los Angeles Dodgers 10 73 17
3. New York Yankees 10 89 9
4. Detroit Tigersb 9 98 0
5. New York Mets 9 92 3
6. Atlanta Braves 7 69 201h
7. Boston Red Sox 7 78 20
8. St. Louis Cardinalsb 6 95 0
9. California Angels 5 75 10
10. Cincinnati Reds 5 84 6
11. Houston Astros 5 76 14
12. Toronto Blue Jays 5 96 2
13. Baltimore Orioles 4 67 31
14. San Francisco Giantsb  4 90 0
15. Chicago White Sox 3 77 8
16. Philadelphia Phillies 3 80 15
17. Kansas City Royals 2 83 2
18. Montreal Expos 2 91 4
19. San Diego Padres 2 65 25
20. Texas Rangers 2 75 10
21. Cleveland Indians 1 61 37
22. Milwaukee Brewers 1 91 7
23. Oakland Athletics 1 81 4
24. Minnesota Twinsc 0 85 0
25. Pittsburgh Pirates 0 80 15
26. Seattle Marinersd 0 78 7
GB = games out of first place at the end of 1987 season.Playoff team in 1987.
World champions in 1987.
As of 1989, the Mariners had never appeared on national television. ENTERTAuENT & SPORTS
PROGRAMMING NETWORK, SPRING TRAINING REP., Mar. 20, 1989.
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TABLE 4. RESULTS OF MULTIPLE REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF 1988
SALARY FOR ALL PITCHERS
Independent Standard Significance
Variable b (Slope) ($) Error t oft
Exp 120,109.95 12,711.60 9.45 .0000
Exp x Exp -3,793.92 666.79 -5.69 .0000
Wins 21,705.31 8,300.87 2.61 .0095
Saves 7,039.37 2,790.99 2.52 .0123
Innings Pitched 2,197.66 980.61 2.24 .0260
Earned Runs -4,146.15 1,621.90 -2.56 .0112
National Television 21,102.12 6,663.52 3.17 .0017
Local Television 753.91 723.80 1.04 .2987
Local Revenue -11,641.92 7,195.56 -1.62 .1070
Race 62,434.02 27,589.70 2.26 .0246
R= .62
N = 246
Intercept = 336,940
TABLE 5. RESULTS OF MULTIPLE REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF 1988
SALARY FOR PITCHERS WITHIN THE RESERVE SYSTEM
Independent b (Slope) Standard Significance
Variable ($) Error t of t
Exp 36,082.94 75,530.00 .48 .6338
Exp x Exp 3,750.88 11,745.90 .32 .7501
Wins 21,391.71 8,752.69 2.44 .0162
Saves -29.18 2,963.29 -. 01 .9922
Innings Pitched 3,324.59 1,014.21 3.28 .0014
Earned Runs -7,005.75 1,524.38 -4.60 .0000
National Television -1,392.83 6,173.62 -. 23 .8219
Local Television 1,040.01 735.60 1.41 .1603
Local Revenue 2,128.44 6,969.65 .31 .7607
Race 67,942.86 26,493.70 2.56 .0117
R= .61
N= 118
Intercept = 93,484.40
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TABLE 6. RESULTS OF MULTIPLE REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF 1988
SALARY FOR PITCHERS WITH MORE THAN 6 YEARS OF
EXPERIENCE (I.E., POTENTIAL FREE AGENTS)
Independent Standard Significance
Variable b (Slope) ($) Error t of t
Exp 196,622.59 37,610.70 5.23 .0000
Exp x Exp -6,686.61 1,500.70 -4.46 .0000
Wins 16,904.90 12,599.60 1.34 .1823
Saves 11,024.95 4,162.66 2.65 .0092
Innings Pitched 2,009.01 1,538.89 1.31 .1943
Earned Runs -2,143.48 2,715.87 -. 79 .4316
National Television 42,214.15 10,811.80 3.90 .0002
Local Television 522.50 1,093.55 .48 .6337
Local Revenue -22,144.30 11,193.50 -1.98 .0503
Race 50,513.32 46,062.40 1.10 .2751
R2 = .46
N= 128
Intercept = 892,744.90
TABLE 7. RESULTS OF MULTIPLE REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF 1988
SALARY FOR ALL WHITE PITCHERS
Independent b (Slope) Standard Significance
Variable ($) Error t oft
Exp 124,142.06 12213 10.16 .0000
Exp x Exp -4,056.30 631.75 -6.42 .0000
Wins 19,173.41 8,041.65 2.38 .0180
Saves 6,835.41 2,770.73 2.47 .0144
Innings Pitched 2,877.01 978.02 2.94 .0036
Earned Runs -5,392.39 1,646.46 -3.28 .0012
National Television 10,637.21 6,628.27 1.60 .1101
Local Television 1,722.38 706.42 2.44 .0156
Local Revenue -8,545.78 7064.26 -1.21 .2278
R2  .65
N = 217
Intercept = 432,014.10
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TABLE 8. RESULTS OF MULTIPLE REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF 1988
SALARY FOR ALL MINORITY PITCHERS
Independent Standard Significance
Variable b (Slope) ($) Error t of t
Exp -70,495.07 79,960.80 -. 88 .3890
Exp x Exp 9,122.05 5,446.92 1.67 .1104
Wins 69,624.03 43,434.70 1.60 .1254
Saves 2,104.44 10,782.00 .20 .8473
Innings Pitched -1,777.13 3,826.57 -. 46 .6476
Earned Runs -490.05 4,907.49 -. 10 .9215
National Television 112,190.96 25,920.60 4.33 .0004
Local Television -3,581.21 2,928.99 -1.22 .2364
Local Revenue -4,6117.17 79,960.80 -. 88 .3890
R 2 = .75
N =29
Intercept = 138,789.73
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